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The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of IT Outsourcing 
Governance, which has become an increasingly significant topic in recent years. In order 
to gain an understanding of this topic, an extensive literature review was performed and 
analyzed with argument mapping. The data yielded from the argument maps was used to 
create a comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing Governance. What resulted was a 
new conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance, focused not only on governance 
structures and decision rights, but also on relationship management. This 
conceptualization not only provides a better understanding, but also presents a sharp 
contrast to the traditional view of IT Governance in which relationship management is 
not a major factor. In addition to the argument maps, a social representations survey was 
performed in order to elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing 
Governance between academics and practitioners. The results of the survey were used to 
perform a core/periphery analysis, which identified core and peripheral concepts used by 
academics and practitioners when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. The core 
topics identified show a high degree of overlap with the dimensions of the framework 
previously developed. Finally, a review of existing technologies developed specifically to 
manage outsourcing arrangements (Outsourcing Relationship Management Tools) was 
performed in order to better understand the alignment between technology and 
management practices. This analysis showed that the features of Outsourcing 
Relationship Management tools seem to be misaligned with the duties and 
responsibilities of people in charge of the day-to-day management of the client-vendor 
relationship. The contribution of this research lies in advancing our understanding of IT 
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Outsourcing Governance by providing a framework and new definition for this concept, 
along with a new theoretical lens to understand the evolution of relationships into 
partnerships. Additionally, this study augments the tools available to researchers by 
introducing argument mapping, a seldom-used technique for discourse analysis that 
proved to be very effective for eliciting relevant dimensions related to IT Outsourcing 
Governance from a literature review.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Research Motivation And Objectives 
The unprecedented growth in outsourcing practices over the past two decades has had a 
profound impact on the business world. Organizations that choose to outsource a function 
or service often do so because they believe that an external party could provide similar or 
even superior levels of service at a lower cost than the company’s internal resources. This 
perception is reinforced by economic principles which suggest that external vendors 
could achieve better economies of scale, provide more focused expertise, and offer 
increased access to a broader, lower-cost labor pool than the average organization would 
have. Although this line of reasoning appears to be grounded in good business sense, 
results from practice show that business relationships borne of outsourcing decisions 
bring with them a new array of thorny problems that have the potential to not only 
hamper an organization’s remaining core operations, but also offset the very cost savings 
that the organization set out to achieve with its initial outsourcing decision. 
When an organization outsources a functional area, it typically does so to reduce 
costs and the amount of managerial energy that it expends on this function. It also, by the 
very definition of outsourcing, seeks to establish a relational distance between itself and 
the outsourced function in order to focus on its core competencies. These objectives, 
however, can serve as blinders, which mask the fact that although an outsourcing event 
may indeed simplify existing managerial responsibilities, it nevertheless also 
simultaneously introduces new, complex relationships between the organization and the 
vendor. In fact, these novel relationships demand as much, if not more, managerial effort 
than required when functions were performed in-house (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Gewald 
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& Helbig, 2006). We then must ask: How do organizations ensure that these ancillary 
effects don’t cancel out the positive results generated through outsourcing? 
The answer to this question is the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance, which 
has become increasingly significant in recent years, as organizations have embraced IT 
outsourcing and adopted it as a common practice (Dibbern et al., 2004). According to 
CIO magazine (Gartner, 2010), governance has ranked among the top 10 concerns of the 
surveyed CIOs for the last 5 years.  This trend is likely to continue due to the increased 
ubiquity of the outsourcing phenomenon and the reduced strategic importance of using 
pure cost reduction as a rationale for undertaking an outsourcing initiative.  
The complexity of the outsourcing decision should not be underestimated. 
Organizations engage in outsourcing because they posit that cost savings will be realized; 
otherwise there is no reason to outsource because the organizational complexity 
introduced would not otherwise be worth it. What is less understood is how to ensure that 
the outsourcing endeavor will create sustainable value to all participating parties – 
including the vendor since partnership arrangements have been shown to increase the 
likelihood of outsourcing success (Grover et al., 1996; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Kern & 
Willcocks, 2002; Klepper, 1995; Lacity et al., 2009; Levina & Ross, 2003; Natovich, 
2003; Willcocks et al., 2007). In this context, understanding the different views and 
philosophies for the governance of an outsourcing arrangement is key to developing 
management practices that would foster successful, long-term outsourcing relationships. 
This understanding, however, remains elusive for both practitioners and academics alike.  
This work seeks to fill this void in knowledge by creating a comprehensive 
framework for IT Outsourcing Governance using a number of theoretical lenses to 
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analyze this phenomenon. IT Outsourcing Governance is an intriguing subject that 
encompasses several disciplines, including Information Systems, Management, and 
Computer Science, to name a few. Consequently, IT Outsourcing Governance could be 
studied from a plethora of philosophical lenses, utilizing multiple methodologies to 
gather and to analyze data. As such, IT Outsourcing Governance presents a wealth of 
research opportunities within our field. One could focus on studying what type of 
governance structures yield the best results; how organizations align cultural differences 
when entering an arrangement; what are the best practices to foster a positive relationship 
(e.g., shared training sessions); what are the desired personality traits of the personnel 
involved in IT Outsourcing Governance; how does IT Outsourcing Governance mesh 
with the internal governance structure of an organization, et cetera.  
The above-mentioned areas of investigation are just a few directions that research 
in IT Outsourcing Governance could take, demonstrating the potential for a rich and 
productive research agenda that could include quantitative and qualitative studies, 
practitioner-oriented publications, and academic articles. In order to keep this work 
manageable, this study focuses on two main areas that would advance our field’s current 
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance. The main objective of this work is to 
uncover the nature of IT Outsourcing Governance, while the other area of interest 
addresses the technology used by outsourcing practitioners in their efforts to manage the 
client-vendor relationship.  As companies begin to take a more strategic approach to 
outsourcing, wherein the goal of the relationship between parties expands from simple 
cost savings to the achievement of the semblance of a business partnership, we can 
observe a concomitant increase in both the complexity and criticality of properly 
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managing the client-vendor relationship. In this context, the establishment of appropriate 
governance structures, combined with the use of adequate management tools, takes on a 
fundamental role in the success of the outsourcing endeavor.  
By focusing on these two areas – the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing 
Governance, and the technology developed to facilitate it – this work establishes a 
foundation for future IS-focused research on these topics. In order to gain a better 
understanding of these areas, a framework was developed for IT Outsourcing Governance 
using conceptualizations from the literature as well as a survey from experts in the IT 
Outsourcing Governance field. The framework could be utilized by others as a reference 
tool to determine future research agendas, design better tools, develop management 
practices, and to have a better overall understanding of what IT Outsourcing Governance 
encompasses, and what it means to practitioners and academics alike. 
The first research question addressed in this work is: How do academics and 
practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance? As referenced above, 
governance has been among the top concerns of CIOs for the past several years. Despite 
the obvious importance of the issue to practitioners, the topic of Outsourcing Governance 
has been highly under-researched, particularly in the academic literature. Practitioners 
have been relying on word-of-mouth and often anecdotal recommendations regarding 
best practices, and the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance has not received the 
attention from academics that it deserves, given the popularity and widespread adoption 
of outsourcing arrangements. The dearth of research in this area, along with the potential 
implications for practice (e.g., changes in the role of IT managers, development of best 
practices, etc.), that might arise from a better understanding of the core concepts relevant 
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to the governance of an outsourcing arrangement, serve as the motivating factors behind 
the first research question. 
In order to answer this question, a comprehensive framework addressing the 
nature of IT Outsourcing Governance was developed based on an exhaustive literature 
review of the topic.  Then, a social representations survey technique was used to elucidate 
the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance held by both consultants and academics. The 
results of this survey were compared with the framework in order to obtain a better 
understanding of this phenomenon.  
With respect to the practical side of IT Outsourcing Governance, new 
management tools have been developed to specifically aid in the management of 
outsourcing arrangements.  These tools collectively are called Outsourcing Relationship 
Management (ORM), and provide the necessary scaffolding upon which client and 
vendors can ostensibly build successful relationships. Collectively, these tools generally 
take the form of software packages that offer monitoring capabilities and analytics tools 
that organizations utilize to measure the performance of the outsourcing relationship. 
The market currently offers a number of ORM software packages. Among the 
most well-known are Janeeva, Enlighta. EquaSiis, and Hiperos. Although these tools 
differ in capabilities, they are all built upon the principles of communication 
enhancement and real-time information, provide several modes of communications 
including RSS feeds, discussion forums, blogs, access to shared documents, etc., and 
tools to evaluate the relationship, such as on-demand analytics and reporting, real-time 
metrics of performance, and continuous monitoring of the Service Level Agreement 
(SLA), to name a few. Despite the many benefits of ORM tools, a study performed in 
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partnership with The Cutter Consortium (Hirschheim et al., 2009) showed that 
participants have either not heard of these tools, or do not consider them to be worth the 
investment.  
There might be several plausible explanations for this surprising finding; 
however, there are none offered in the literature. This may be because the governance of 
an outsourcing relationship is often considered an afterthought in the outsourcing process, 
for which there is little or no budget, no dedicated staff, and no consideration given to the 
skill set required to effectively manage the client-vendor relationship (Hirschheim et al., 
2009).   One possible explanation for these findings is that the feature-set offered by 
ORM tools does not align with the desired outcomes of IT Outsourcing Governance, 
making their usefulness questionable. This is the key motivator for the second research 
question that will be addressed in this work: Do the features of the selected ORM tools 
correspond with the dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance identified in the proposed 
framework?  
In order to answer this question, the feature sets offered by the various ORM tools 
included in this study will be matched with the dimensions of IT Outsourcing 
Governance identified in the framework previously developed. 
Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a survey of relevant 
literature on the key concepts regarding IT Outsourcing, IT Governance and IT 
Outsourcing Governance. Understanding these concepts is important because they 
represent the foundational concepts of this study and will be referenced throughout this 
work. Chapter 3 discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the methodologies 
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employed in this work, which will serve to better understand the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underlying this research that provide the necessary lens to 
appropriately evaluate the results of this dissertation. Chapter 4 presents the methodology 
and data collection techniques used in this work. In Chapter 5, the results of this study are 
presented followed by a discussion of the findings in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 
includes a summary of the key contributions of this work, implications for practice, and 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides an overview of key concepts that will be used throughout this 
work. In order to properly understand IT Outsourcing Governance, it is important to 
review the literature in IT Outsourcing, the staged process of formally engaging in 
outsourcing from the customer’s point of view, the legal structures that outsourcing 
arrangements most often utilize, and the role of the CIO in this process. We then turn to a 
discussion of IT Governance, and discuss its niche in the field of corporate governance, 
and provide the multiple definitions of the term that currently reside in the literature. 
Finally, we present a discussion of the scant literature on IT Outsourcing Governance. 
Review of IT Outsourcing 
The general concept of outsourcing, which is commonly understood as the practice of 
making arrangements with an external entity to transfer the provision of goods and 
services from within the organization to the external party, has been around for decades 
and is utilized across many disciplines (Dibbern et al., 2004). In the IS field, the 
outsourcing phenomenon began to gain popularity largely with the 1992 study of the 
large outsourcing initiative launched by Kodak (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). Since then, 
the outsourcing phenomenon has been widely studied and subsequently, several 
definitions of outsourcing have been developed (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Kern, 
1997; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity et al., 2009; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). 
Although there are many conceptualizations of IT outsourcing, all of the definitions share 
a common foundation that can be summarized in the straightforward definition of IT 
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outsourcing provided by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993), which defines outsourcing as 
“the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided internally.” 
Types of Outsourcing Arrangements 
The conceptualization of IT outsourcing can be further characterized by the level and 
amount of services/goods outsourced, and by the level of ownership maintained within 
the organization. Consequently, IT outsourcing can be classified in the following 
categories (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Willcocks et al., 2007): 
• Total Outsourcing: The decision to transfer the equivalent of more than 80% of 
the function’s operating budget for assets, leases, staff, and management 
responsibility to external providers. This outsourcing option is associated with 
problems such as lack of innovation from the supplier, excess fees for services 
beyond the contract, fixed prices that exceeded market prices two years into the 
contract, et cetera.  
• Total Insourcing: The decision to retain management and provision of more than 
80% of the function’s operating budget internally after evaluating the services 
market.  
• Selective Outsourcing: This is the most common type of outsourcing, which is 
defined as the company’s decision to source selected functions from external 
provider(s), while still providing between 20% and 80% of the function’s 
operating budget internally.  
• Joint Ventures: The organization and external provider create a new company or 
business unit. Deals are typically structured so that the customer provides 
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personnel, becomes the venture’s first major customer, and shares in future profits 
if the venture attracts external customers.  
In addition to the different types of outsourcing arrangements, it is important to 
understand the different stages involved in the outsourcing process. The outsourcing 
stages provide a roadmap to outsourcing highlighting the different types of decisions that 
need to be made from inception to implementation and execution of a sourcing 
arrangement.  
Outsourcing Stages 
The outsourcing process can be divided into five distinct stages that reflect the different 
factors that businesses consider in their outsourcing analyses, as well as the decisions that 
are typically made when outsourcing (Dibbern et al., 2004). The stages, as depicted in 
Figure!1, are: 
• Why: In this stage, the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing are 
considered. 
 
• What: Different alternatives of outsourcing arrangements are analyzed. 
 
• Which: This stage is based on the decision that the organization makes when 
comparing various sourcing options. 
 
• How: This stage deals with the selection of the vendor, the management of 
contracts, and relationships. 
 
• Outcomes: The analysis of the consequences of the sourcing decision, and the 
assessment of success or failure. 
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The five stages of outsourcing can be further classified into two overarching categories 
that describe the decision process to outsource, and the implementation of the sourcing 
arrangement.  
Figure 1 - Outsourcing Stages 
 
 This work will focus on!the study of the implementation stage of outsourcing 
arrangements (Stages 4 and 5, above) because IT Outsourcing Governance only takes 
place after the decision to outsource has been made, a vendor has been selected for the 
particular project, and the organization has selected the arrangement of sourcing that is 
most convenient and beneficial to them. The next logical step in the process is to decide 
how to carry out the outsourcing process. This stage (Stage 4, depicted above) deals 
mainly with three actions: vendor selection, contract negotiation (relationship building), 
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and contract/relationship management. A brief description of each action is provided 
below. 
Vendor Selection 
In the vendor selection stage, an organization may choose from a multitude of 
arrangements: one client to one vendor, one client to many vendors, many clients to many 
vendors, and many clients to many vendors. A brief description of each type of 
relationship follows, using Gallivan and Oh’ definitions (1999): 
• One Client - One Vendor:  The client relies on a single vendor to satisfy all of its 
outsourcing needs. These types of deals often involve a major vendor that is 
equipped with the market power and knowledge expertise to provide a 
comprehensive IT solution. An advantage of this type of relationship is the 
potential for cost savings as a result of having one vendor providing a large set of 
services. On the other hand, having only one vendor may lead to proprietary 
solutions that can make the adoption of other products very difficult. 
• One Client - Many Vendors: In this scenario, one client utilizes multiple 
vendors to achieve its goals. The division of labor and responsibilities among 
vendors is jointly negotiated and understood by all parties. The advantage of this 
type of arrangement is the ability to fit every need with a vendor, whose strength 
is in the same area, thereby obtaining optimal results. However, these many 
vendor deals can be extremely complex and difficult to handle at the contract 




Contract crafting and negotiation has been identified as one of the main factors 
determining the success of an outsourcing arrangement (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; 
Hirschheim et al., 2009; Willcocks et al., 2007). During the negotiation stage, the client 
and vendor communicate with each other to exchange information about their respective 
capabilities, positions and interests. The purpose of a formal contract is to specify task 
requirements and obligations of each party in a written form. However, organizations 
should strive for flexibility at the contractual level in order to adjust to unforeseen 
circumstances not included in the original contract (Goo et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Willcocks et al., 2007). A company’s procurement department by and large carries 
out the crafting of the contract and the evaluation of its execution. There are several types 
of contracts that can be used in a sourcing relationship (Willcocks et al., 2007). These 
vary based on the level of detail contained by the contracts: 
• Standard Contracts: The customer signs the supplier’s standard, off-the-shelf 
contract. 
• Detailed Contracts: The contract includes special contractual clauses for service 
scope, service levels, measures of performance, and penalties for not meeting 
agreed upon deadlines or objectives. 
• Loose Contracts: The contract does not provide comprehensive performance 
measures or contingencies, but specifies that the supplier(s) perform whatever the 
customer was doing in the baseline year for the duration of the contract at 10-30% 
less than the customer’s budget. 
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• Mixed Contracts: For the first few years of the contract, requirements are fully 
specified. However, long-term requirements are not defined in a detailed manner. 
According to the findings of Willcocks et al. (2007), detailed contracts facilitated the 
achievement of  customer expectations with greater frequency than the other types. In 
these cases, organizations understood the functions to be outsourced fairly well, and they 
could therefore define their precise requirements in a contract. Additionally, 
organizations developing detailed contracts spent up to 18 months negotiating the clauses 
of the contract. This careful process of negotiation revealed a 75% rate of successful 
contracts. The most commonly clauses used in detailed contracts are Costs, Early 
Termination, Non-performance Penalty, Confidentiality, Liability, Service Level 
Agreement, and Contingency Prices (Willcocks et al., 2007). 
Contract Management 
A good contract is necessary but not sufficient for a successful IT outsourcing project 
(Hirschheim et al., 2009). Since market conditions are bound to change, the contracts 
may not include the foresight sufficient to cope with changes. Therefore, a formal 
contract, regardless of its length or level of detail, should be complemented by informal 
management techniques that provide a level of flexibility that is not found in formal 
management. No matter how detailed a contract is, changes in requirements will 
inevitably occur in the normal course of business. A formal contract cannot account for 
all possible situations that might arise as a consequence of shifts in the global markets, 
local policies, or organizational changes. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to 
develop an organizational capacity to manage and foster the informal relationship 
between the client and vendor. Informal management provides the means for developing 
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common goals and objectives between the client and vendor, which in turn can lead to an 
increase in trust and commitment between parties (Grover et al., 1996). 
In summary, for an outsourcing arrangement to be successful, the organization 
must maintain clear control processes, effective communication channels and governance 
structure with a team of their own individuals who understand the work being done and 
the processes being used by the vendor. 
Review of IT Governance 
In this section, we discuss the evolution of the IT function in corporate settings, the role 
of the CIO in managing the ever-changing IT function, and the role of IT Governance in 
the organization. The various definitions of IT Governance are presented first, followed 
by a discussion about how bestowing the appropriate definition provides the proper 
context for discussion the importance of the role of IT Governance. Finally, the most 
common structures for IT Governance are treated. 
IT Governance is often considered a sub-set of Corporate Governance, which was 
developed in response to the growing importance of IT within organizations (Kingsford 
et al., 2003). Corporate Governance provides the structure for determining organizational 
objectives and for monitoring performance to ensure that those objectives are attained 
(OECD, 1999).  Although there is no “one size fits all” governance structure, most 
companies have adopted a corporate governance model based on a supervisory board that 
is responsible for protecting the interests and rights of shareholders and other 
stakeholders (customers, employees, creditors, etc.). The board, in turn, works with 
senior managers to implement governance principles across the organization (Weill & 
Ross, 2008).  
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The adoption of IT during the late 50’s and 60’s started a process of 
transformation of organizations that is still ongoing (Leavitt & Whistler, 1958). The 
research of transformation processes that has occurred during the last five decades 
covered the impact of IT in organizations (Drucker, 1988), how to obtain strategic 
advantage using IT (Ives & Learmonth, 1984; Porter & Miller, 1985; Weill, 1992), how 
to properly manage organizations dependent on IT (Applegate, 1995; Burns & Stalker, 
1961), and the future of organizations given the current utilization of technology 
(Bieberstein et al., 2005).  
At the very core of the organizational transformations experienced since the 
1950’s is the evolving role of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), also known as 
Information Systems Manager during the late 70’s (Taggart & Silbey, 1979). Since its 
inception, the information management function has expanded incredibly from its 
original limited conception (supporting accounting activities) to a comprehensive 
function that supports the entire organization in a fundamental way. The evolution of the 
role of IT within organizations was necessarily accompanied by the evolution of the role 
of the CIO (Hirschheim et al., 2003). In 2005, Michael Hammer wrote a seminal CIO 
Magazine keynote article that dealt with CIO Evolution (Hammer, 2005). In this article, 
the author emphasizes that throughout the last 30 years, the main goals of the CIO have 
remained constant, yet now there are other challenges, such as outsourcing that make the 
CIO role even more complicated. According to Hammer “To avoid extinction, CIOs must 
move from an orientation that revolves around technology to one centered on business 
processes.” In this context, the role of IT Governance has gained prominence within the 
corporate governance structure due to the fact that it is now recognized that leveraging IT 
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successfully to transform the enterprise and create value-added products and services has 
become a universal business necessity (ITGI, 2006), and not simply operational support. 
According to Ron Rose, CIO at priceline.com Inc. (Hoffman, 2007) “regardless of a 
CIO’s roots, he has to almost be a better business person than the business people…” 
Therefore, implementing the appropriate governance structures for IT is a major 
undertaking the CIO must face. 
Defining IT Governance 
IT Governance is not an isolated activity, but instead occurs within the context of the 
corporate governance of the organization and it is usually the responsibility of the board 
of directors and senior executives within the company (ITGI, 2006; Weill & Ross, 2008). 
According to the IT Governance Institute, IT Governance consists of the leadership and 
organizational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sustains and 
extends the enterprise’s strategies and objectives. The purpose of IT Governance is to 
direct IT endeavors to ensure that IT’s performance meet the following objectives (ITGI, 
2006): 
• Alignment of IT with the enterprise and realization of the promised  benefits  
• Use of IT to enable the enterprise by exploiting opportunities and  maximizing 
benefits  
 
• Responsible use of IT resources  
• Appropriate management of IT-related risks  
This conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance is focused on identifying 
objectives that must be achieved through the outsourcing arrangement. However, this 
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definition mixes IT Governance with IT Management, which is a frequent mistake (Webb 
et al., 2006).  
A more straight-forward, yet powerful, definition of IT Governance is provided 
by Weill and Ross (2008), which  defines the term as a verb rather than a of a noun. For 
these authors, IT Governance is defined as “specifying the decision rights and 
accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT.” This 
succinct conceptualization not only captures the spirit of other definitions (Luffman, 
1996; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Weill & Vitale, 2002), but it also reflects the 
inherent complexity of IT Governance by not attempting to define “desirable behavior in 
the use of IT.” In the case of the definition put forth by the IT Governance Institute, 
“desirable behavior” is a subjective measure that cannot be defined meaningfully in a 
way that will fit the needs of every organization. Therefore, the Weill and Ross definition 
captures the simple nature of governance – decision rights and accountability – that is 
applied specifically to IT. 
Weill and Ross’ definition sheds further light on to the nature of IT Governance 
by recognizing that governance structures may not match the desired behaviors in the use 
of IT that they seek to encourage. In this case, a complementary governance structure 
arises to fill the gap between the formal structure implemented by senior executives and 
the practices used by workers to achieve their objectives. Therefore, IT Governance can 
be understood to have two complementary dimensions: a behavioral dimension that 
defines the formal and informal relationships and assigns decision rights to specific 
individuals in order to encourage desirable behavior, as well as a normative side that 
defines mechanisms for formalizing relationships and providing rules and operating 
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procedures to ensure that objectives are met. For example, if desirable behavior involves 
independent and entrepreneurial business units, senior management will allocate the 
decision rights for IT investments to the heads of the business units. In contrast, if 
desirable behavior involves an enterprise-wide view of the customer with single point of 
contact with the customer, senior management will not allocate decision rights to the 
individual business units, deciding instead to implement a more centralized IT investment 
government model. Failing to take into account both behavioral and normative sides of IT 
Governance can result in a mismatch between desirable behavior and governance 
structure, which will create operational inefficiencies due to the fact that the decision 
rights will be assigned to people that are not in position to encourage the desirable 
behavior that supports business goals.  
The Importance of IT Governance 
Establishing effective IT Governance can be an onerous task that requires continuous 
attention from top executives. However, the growing dependence of modern 
organizations on IT seems to indicate that investing time and effort in developing 
effective IT Governance is the right decision (ITGI, 2006; Weill & Ross, 2008). While IT 
is fundamental to sustain business operations, it is equally essential to grow and innovate 
the business in a networked economy that can change market conditions rapidly 
(Hammer, 2005; ITGI, 2006). 
In addition to the inherent importance of IT within the organization, the case for 
effective IT Governance can be made from a purely economic perspective. The average 
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IT investment represents approximately 4%1 of an organization’s gross revenue (Webb et 
al., 2006). Thus, in order to protect the organization’s investment, IT Governance 
becomes more important in a financial sense. As IT becomes more pervasive throughout 
the organization, managers and executives must ensure that effective IT Governance is 
implemented in order to empower the right people to make the right decisions to 
maximize the value that IT brings to the organization. 
Structures for IT Governance 
Attempting to prescribe a particular IT Governance structure is a very difficult 
proposition due to the fact that different organizations will employ different 
organizational structures that best fit their needs. There is no “one size fits all” kind of 
solution for this problem (Weill & Ross, 2008). However, different archetypes have been 
developed in order to offer guidance to practitioners (ITGI, 2006; Sambamurthy & Zmud, 
1999, 2000; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Weill & Ross, 2008). Although these 
recommendations are not exhaustive, they do fulfill their purpose of shedding light on to 
the intricacies of IT Governance. 
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) provides guidelines for IT Governance 
structure without providing a particular archetype or framework. According to ITGI, IT 
Governance is the responsibility of the board and executives and it occurs at different 
layers or levels within the organization, with team leaders reporting and receiving 
direction from their managers, with managers reporting to the executives, and the 
executives reporting to the board of directors. The board should be very clear about its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!IT investment as percentage of revenue varies widely across industries. For more information refer to 
http://www.gartner.com/technology/consulting/key_metrics_data.jsp!
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own responsibilities as well as the responsibilities of the executives and management 
team, and it should have a system or structure that matches those responsibilities. The 
governance process, according to ITGI, starts with setting objectives for the enterprise’s 
IT, providing the initial direction, and from then on, a continuous loop is established for 
measuring performance, comparing to objectives, and resulting in the redirection of 
activities where necessary and a change of objectives where appropriate (ITGI, 2006). 
Another practice oriented attempt at defining what the best structures for IT 
Governance are is the one carried out by Weill and Ross (2008). The authors identified 
five key interrelated IT decisions that are required for effective governance: IT 
Principles, IT Architecture, IT Infrastructure, Business Application Needs, and IT 
Investment and Prioritization. These decisions can be defined as follows: 
• IT Principles: Clarifying the business role of IT. High-level statements about 
how IT is used in the business. 
• IT Architecture: Defining integration and standardization requirements based on 
IT Principles. 
• IT Infrastructure: Determining and enabling shared services that provide the 
foundation for the enterprise’s IT capability according to the underlying IT 
Architecture. 
• Business Application Needs: Specifying the business need for purchased or 
internally-developed IT applications enabled by existing IT Infrastructure.  
• IT Investment and Prioritization: Choosing which initiatives to fund and how 
much to spend based on the IT Principles, Architecture, Infrastructure and 
Application Needs.  
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These five key decisions are interrelated, and in fact, must be linked to facilitate effective 
governance (Weill & Ross, 2008).  
In addition to the five key decisions discussed above, the authors developed six 
governance archetypes that describe the typical roles of the personnel who are involved 
in making these decisions. These six archetypes are as follows, and are described further 
below: Business Monarchy, IT Monarchy, Feudal, Federal, IT Duopoly, and Anarchy.  
• Business Monarchy: In a business monarchy, a group of business executives or 
individual executives make IT decisions affecting the entire enterprise. Typically, 
business monarchies rely on input for key decisions from many sources, such as 
IT leaders from the business units, service-level agreements, reports to the CIO, 
etc.  
• IT Monarchy: In an IT monarchy, IT professionals make all IT related decisions. 
A typical structure for an IT Monarchy is the formation of an IT Governance 
Committee, which consists of senior IT executives that make the strategic 
decisions that affect IT. 
• Feudal: In the feudal model, the decision rights are delegated to business unit 
leaders, key process owners, or their delegates. This model is uncommon because 
it leads to lack of synergy between business units. 
• Federal: These arrangements attempt to balance the responsibilities and 
accountabilities of multiple governing bodies, such as country and states. In the 
context of IT Governance, C-level executives and business groups may also 
include IT executives as additional participants of the governing body. Equivalent 
to the central and state governments working together, the biggest, most powerful 
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business units often get the most resources, causing dissatisfaction in smaller 
business units. 
• IT Duopoly: The IT duopoly is a two-party arrangement in which decisions 
represent a bilateral agreement between IT executives and one other group such as 
CxOs, business unit leaders or business process owners.  
• Anarchy: Within anarchies, individuals or small groups make their own decisions 
based only on their local needs. Anarchies allow for very rapid responsiveness to 
local or individual customer needs at the expense of enterprise-wide 
standardization. 
The IT decisions identified by the authors, coupled with the archetypes developed from 
insights from practice, align with the types of decisions that need to be made and who 
should make them. However, how these decisions will be made and monitored requires 
design and implementation of governance mechanisms such as committees, roles, and 
formal processes. 
In the academic arena, one of the prominent views on IT Governance structures is 
the one provided by Sambamurthy and Zmud (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, 2000; 
Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Webb et al., 2006). The authors assert that over the last 20 
years, three primary modes of IT Governance have emerged as the prevalent structures: 
centralized, decentralized, and the federal mode. In the centralized governance mode, 
corporate IS has the authority over all three spheres of IT (IT infrastructure management, 
IT use management, and project management). With the decentralized governance mode, 
the decision-making authority moves from corporate IS departments to divisional IS, and 
line management that assumes authority for all IT activities. Lastly, with the federal 
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governance mode, both corporate IS and the business units, either the divisional IS or line 
management, assumes authority for specific spheres of IT activities. 
Based on the work of Sambamurthy and Zmud, Schwarz and Hirschheim used an 
extended platform logic model to study IT Governance (Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003). 
The results of their research indicate that practitioners have moved past the 
centralization-decentralization paradigm to embrace a relationship-based view of 
governance. Looking beyond how the organization chart depicts IT governance toward 
how IT seeks to create relationships with the business units requires a social view of IT 
governance that will increase our understanding on how structures impact an 
organization’s underlying working structure (Bate et al., 2000).  
Review of IT Outsourcing Governance 
In recent years, the significance of IT Outsourcing Governance has taken on heightened 
importance. As noted earlier, governance ranks among the top ten concerns of a CIO for 
at least last five years (Gartner, 2010).  This trend is likely to continue due to the 
increased ubiquity of the outsourcing phenomenon and the related reduction in strategic 
importance of pure cost-reduction strategies. The continuous growing impact of IT 
services on the performance of business processes highlights the need for governance 
structures in outsourcing relationships (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Hirschheim et al., 
2009). Despite the recognized importance of governance structures, there is a surprising 
dearth of research articles dealing specifically with the topic of IT Outsourcing 
Governance (Meng et al., 2006). 
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Defining IT Outsourcing Governance 
There aren’t many definitions of IT Outsourcing Governance in the literature. Some 
general definitions rely heavily on IT Governance definitions as a foundation to 
investigate the client-vendor relationship (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Beulen & Ribbers, 
2007; Klepper, 1995). Other authors have provided more specific definitions of IT 
Outsourcing Governance as it is the case of Gewald and Helbig (2006). The authors 
define IT Outsourcing Governance as the “overarching structure which helps to support 
the business objectives of the customer on [the] strategic, functional and operational 
level. The governance model defines "what to do", "how to do it", "who should do it" and 
"how it should be measured". It addresses the rules, processes, metrics and 
organizational structures needed for effective planning, decision making, steering and 
control of the outsourcing engagement in order to mitigate the risk inherent in any 
outsourcing relationship” (pp. 3-4). According to the authors, IT Outsourcing 
Governance provides a framework to steer and control the outsourcing engagement in a 
way based on partnership and mutual trust with relationship management as an integral 
part of the governance model. 
Another definition in the form of a framework establishes IT Outsourcing 
Governance as a model that consists of three core dimensions: the outsourcing 
governance process, outsourcing organizational structure and performance measurement 
(Meng et al., 2006). The outsourcing process defines the steps to follow for key 
outsourcing decisions, the outsourcing organizational structure clarifies the roles and 
their accountabilities in the outsourcing arrangement, and finally, the outsourcing 
performance measurement focuses on monitoring the performance of the outsourcing 
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relationship. From the three dimensions specified, it is clear that the only one that deals 
solely with IT Outsourcing Governance is the organizational structure dimension. In this 
context, the authors provide an organizational structure reference model that highlights 
the central point of what they consider an ideal governance structure. At the client side, 
the authors propose the creation of an Outsourcing Office responsible for establishing the 
outsourcing strategy, processes and standards while the vendor counterpart is the 
Program Management Office. The authors recommend several layers of equivalent 
positions between client and vendor in order guarantee horizontal communication at all 
levels across organizations. 
A more succinct definition of IT Outsourcing governance is provided by the IT 
Governance Institute, that defines IT Outsourcing Governance (Simmons, 2005) as the 
“set of responsibilities, roles, objectives, interfaces and controls required to anticipate 
change and manage the introduction, maintenance, performance, costs and control of 
third-party- provided services” (p. 7). Inherent in this definition is the notion that IT 
Outsourcing Governance is an active, constantly evolving process that client and vendors 
must adopt to provide a common and effective approach to control and manage 
exchanges among all stakeholders from both parties. As the authors state, “As a strategic 
resource, outsourcing must be governed accordingly. This is not just about purchasing 
but about effective management and ensuring that both parties benefit” (p. 7). 
Understanding the different views and core concepts relevant to the governance of 
an outsourcing arrangement is key to generating management practices that would foster 
successful outsourcing relationships. This understanding, however, remains elusive for 
both practitioners and academics alike. This work seeks to fill this void in knowledge by 
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creating a comprehensive framework that will contribute to our understanding of what IT 





CHAPTER 3: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
!
It is only through the understanding of ontological and epistemological assumptions 
underlying research methodology that we can truly evaluate the results of any research 
endeavor. Any pursuit of knowledge is always faced with what are often referred to as the 
“essential problem in science.” That is, how do we know what we know, and how do we 
acquire knowledge? (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000). Thus, before proceeding to the 
description of the methodological approaches used and the discussion of the results 
obtained in this research, it is important to clarify the philosophical underpinnings of the 
methodologies used in this work, especially when working within a pluralistic field that 
contains a plethora of philosophical approaches (Benbasat & Weber, 1996). First, a 
discussion of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action provides the ontological and 
epistemological foundation for this study. Then, a description of Toulmin’s informal 
logic is provided in order to establish the basic philosophy behind the argument mapping 
methodology used in this work. Finally, an introduction to Social Representations theory 
is provided to familiarize the reader with this important theory that is used in the 
methodology section to gain better understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance through 
a social representations survey of experts in the field.  
Theory of Communicative Action  
Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984a, b) addresses the central 
quandary of what it means to be reasonable, and by expanding the parameters of 
reasonable discourse with respect to a given proposition’s realm of concern.  According 
to Habermas, the depiction of rationality as “the most efficient means to important ends” 
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(Abrahamson, 1996) or as “goal-rational” behavior is an unnecessarily limited portrayal 
of reason derived from the restrictive influence of the philosophy of consciousness.  The 
philosophy of consciousness conceives of subjective reason as regulating two relations 
which the subject can have to an object, namely that of cognition, in which the object is 
allegedly represented as it is, and that of action, in which it is produced as it should be 
(Brand, 1990). Habermas, however, criticizes this philosophical underpinning as being 
too narrow, because by exclusively focusing on subject-object relationships it becomes 
blind to intersubjective or subject-subject relations, which provides meaning and context 
to the subject-object relationship.  Unlike in subject-object activities where rationality can 
be depicted as an individual subject’s cognition and manipulation of an object, in subject-
subject relations – what he terms ‘social action’ - the locus of rationality can be found in 
the shared understanding that gives meaning to these acts of cognition and manipulation 
of objects. Reason, according to Habermas, is not to be found in a single subject but in 
the relations of subjects.  Habermas consequently depicts reason or rationality as a 
“communicative rationality.” 
The central intuition underpinning Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality is the 
notion that the fact that humans can use language is evidence of an innate capacity for 
reason. As he writes in one of his early treatments of the subject (Habermas, 1970), “With 
the first sentence used the intention to reach a general and uncompelled consensus is 
pronounced unmistakably” (p. 163).  The key issue in human communication is “how is 
understanding (among speaking and acting subjects) possible in general?” (McCarthy, 
1982).  
! 30!
In the context of an organization’s decision to implement an outsourcing arrangement, 
this question would take the form of how individuals who begin at mutually unknown 
and substantially different starting points regarding the particular strategy arrive at 
converging interpretations that allow them to achieve consensus on coordinating their 
future actions.  The basic vehicle for this coordination process is language (or equivalent 
extra-verbal expressions such as body gestures). Communicative rationality consequently 
is the common enterprise of achieving consensus in a situation in which all participants 
are free to have their say and have equal chances to express their views – a situation that 
Habermas describes as the “ideal speech situation”.  
According to Habermas (1984b) social action can be divided into two 
orientations: an orientation to succeed (instrumental action when this orientation is 
related to objects and strategic action when it is related to subjects) and an orientation to 
reach an understanding (communicative action).  Instrumental and strategic actions 
consequently can be assessed along a singular dimension of rationality.  Instrumental 
actions can be evaluated by measuring the efficiency with which objects are manipulated 
to achieve particular goals while strategic actions can be “appraised from the standpoint 
of the efficiency of influencing the decisions of rational opponents” (McCarthy, 1982).  
In communicative action however the goal is the achievement of understanding where “to 
reach understanding means here that the partners in interaction set out, and manage to 
convince, each other, so that their action is coordinated on the basis of motivation 
through reason” (Brand, 1990).  The coordination mechanism of communicative action 
differs from that of strategic action in that the latter is based on egocentric calculations 
and is coordinated on the basis of a communion of interests (as is exampled in market 
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economies) whereas the former is based on the pure force of the better argument. Not that 
communicative action nullifies individualistic motivations, but in communicative action 
these ends are subjugated to the use of language in a manner that is oriented towards 
achieving understanding.  The essential difference is that in strategic action, ego 
influences the choice decisions not through criticizable claims couched in language but 
by sanctions, or gratifications, force or money.  In communicative action (Habermas, 
1984b), agreement “cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through 
intervention in the situation directly or strategically though influencing the decisions of 
opponents… what comes to pass manifestly through outside influence… cannot count 
subjectively as agreement.  Agreement rests on common convictions” (p. 287). 
Habermas consequently addresses a central quandary of the outsourcing governance 
literature when he places the locus of reason or rationality in the act of communication 
itself and not a predefined outcome or goal. By introducing the concept of 
communicative rationality, which is geared towards the development of normative 
understanding and agreement, Habermas allows for the existence of reasonable discourse 
even in amorphous or uncontrolled settings.  Indeed, according to Habermas, the less 
controlled the setting the more rational or reasonable the discourse is likely to be.   This 
unconstrained setting is what Habermas terms as the “ideal speech situation.”   The ideal 
speech situation is a hypothetical situation which is characterized by: (a) an open agenda 
and free access in which all claims and counterclaims can be freely examined; (b) no 
asymmetries of knowledge or power (a community of peers) so that all have an equal 
chance to be heard and no one can be intimidated; and (c) a social atmosphere that 
encourages everyone to express their feelings, to question and examine those feelings so 
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as to minimize the chances of self-delusion and insincerity (people saying things that they 
do not really mean) (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991).  While this “ideal” is never actually 
realized in everyday communication, it does provide a lens by which rational discourse 
could be examined because the closer the communication is to the ideal type the more 
rational it could be deemed to be and vice-versa. 
The second contribution of Habermas’ theory is based on his proposition that how 
claims are determined to be valid or reasonable varies depending on three ontological 
relations of actors and the corresponding concepts of the objective, social and subjective 
world (O'Donnell & Henriksen, 2002). According to Habermas, claims of fact, truth or 
efficacy are reasonably made with regard to objective/physical phenomena. In this realm, 
claims can be verified by multiple observers using procedures that render social values 
and individual idiosyncrasies irrelevant. Claims pertinent to social phenomena however 
are only verifiable by testing the level of agreement or conflict that the claims have with 
principles that govern relations between, and the rights of individuals within a society. 
The validation process in this realm is not irrational, but presupposes an open forum for 
discussion that is free from coercion or control. Rational discourse in this sphere of 
reasoning addresses questions such as what is good or bad, or right and wrong in an 
organization and is well suited to make recommendations about what courses of action 
should or should not be taken (Klein & Hirschheim, 2001). The subjective world deals 
with claims of sincerity or authenticity which refer to each person’s inner experiences to 
which he or she has privileged access (Brand, 1990). In this context, an individual may 
challenge the validity of a claim because he/she holds doubts regarding the intentions or 
sincerity of the speaker.  
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Toulmin’s Informal Logic 
Informal logic attempts to identify general criteria for good reasoning, and defines 
positive argument schema that specify particular forms of good reasoning. According to 
Toulmin (1958), “logic is concerned with the soundness of the claims we make – with the 
solidity of the grounds we produce to support them, the firmness of the backing we 
provide for them” (p. 7). 
In his book The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin proposed that a valid 
argument has a proper form, analogous to a legal argument that can be laid out for 
inspection. Toulmin further proposed that the question “How does our cognitive 
equipment function?” is philosophically equivalent to the question, “What sorts of 
arguments could be produced for the things we claim to know?” (Toulmin, 1958). In this 
context, the study of arguments is of special importance to decision makers, due to the 
fact that they spend most of their time and resources trying to elucidate and communicate 
which claims are credible, plausible, and possible. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
observed, “The domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the 
probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations” (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Toulmin provides a formal method to analyze arguments and 
thus, determine their credibility, plausibility and possibility. In Toulmin’s words “A 
sound argument, a well-grounded or firmly-backed claim, is one which will stand up to 
criticism, one for which a case can be presented coming up to the standard required if it 
is to deserve a favorable verdict” (p. 8). The focus of Toulmin’s logic is in “justificatory 
arguments” brought forward in support of assertions, in the structures they may be 
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expected to have, the merits they can claim, and the ways in which we set about grading, 
assessing and criticizing them.  
The Layout of Arguments 
One of the main strengths of the mathematical approach to logic is the idea of providing a 
clear form to a valid argument wherein the use of axioms, mathematics and geometry 
hypothesis can be tested, conclusions derived and consensus reached. If one thinks of 
logic in the context of sociology or psychology, the notion of logical form becomes 
elusive, making it difficult to assess the validity of claims. 
Figure'2')'Layout'of'Arguments'
However, by analyzing the types of arguments used in different disciplines, one can 
observe that arguments dealing with physical impossibilities, linguistic solecisms, legal 
or moral offenses, improprieties of judicial procedures, conceptual incongruities or 
mathematical impossibilities all share a common pattern that can be used to elucidate 
what is the proper form or structure of an argument. According to Toulmin (1958), the 
main components of an argument are Grounds (or data), Warrants, Qualifiers, Rebuttals 
and Claims. The interrelationships between these concepts are depicted in Figure 2, and 
they form the skeleton or scaffold that describes the layout of arguments.   
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Supposing that in the course of a discussion, an assertion is made, and the speaker 
commits to the validity of the claim inherently associated with this assertion, the speaker 
will be forced to present grounds that will serve as the foundation upon which the claim 
is based. The proposed layout for the structure of arguments is elusive, making it difficult 
to assess the validity of claim. Figure 2 depicts the process by which facts can be used to 
logically support a particular claim. What follows is a description of the relationships 
between the different components of the argument layout. 
The most obvious distinction that we have described already is the one between a 
Claim, whose merits we are seeking to establish, and the Grounds or data we use as 
foundation for the Claim. Producing facts (Grounds) as a response to a challenge of our 
claim may serve to satisfy any doubts regarding the validity of the Claim. However, even 
after the Grounds for a Claim have been provided, a different kind of question can be 
asked. Instead of asking what kind of evidence exists to support a claim, the challenger 
could ask, based on the existence evidence: How can one arrive at the proposed 
conclusion? This logical step connecting Grounds with Claims is filled by the 
introduction of Warrants.  These propositions are incidental and explanatory, allowing for 
the logical jump between the claim and its grounds. Warrants can further be classified in 
the following categories: 
• Substantive: refer the listener to facts or logic that the speaker assumes 
will be accepted without further argument 
• Authoritative: are often left to the audience’s inference relying on the 
speaker’s perceived authority 
• Motivational: appeal to the listener’s values 
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Since Warrants can be of different types, they consequently confer different degrees of 
force on the conclusions (Claims) they justify. Some Warrants, given the appropriate 
Grounds, allow for the unequivocal acceptance of a Claim; others only provide enough 
support for the Claim under particular conditions, exceptions or qualifications. Therefore, 
it isn’t enough to simply specify Grounds and Warrants in support of a Claim. There is a 
need for a Qualifier that can provide an explicit reference to the degree of force that the 
data confer on the claim in virtue of the warrant. Similar to Qualifiers, Rebuttals express 
conditions of exception indicating the circumstances in which the general authority of the 
Warrant would have to be set aside.  
Figure 3 - Example of Argument Layout 
 
In order to illustrate the interaction of all components of an argument, let us 
consider the Claim that Harry is a British subject. This Claim can normally be defended 
by pointing to the fact that Harry was born in Bermuda. However, the place of birth by 
itself is not sufficient evidence (Grounds) to support the Claim in the absence of other 
considerations such as nationality of his parents, or Harry changing his nationality since 
birth. A graphical depiction of this example is provided in Figure!3. 
! 37!
Although Toulmin maintains that the layout of arguments he proposes applies to 
all disciplines, it is important to highlight that according to Toulmin, the validity of a 
claim is an intra-field, not an inter-field notion (Toulmin, 1958). According to Toulmin, 
“Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the data and conclusions in 
each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type: they will be said to 
come from different fields when the backing of the conclusions in each of the two 
arguments are not of the same logical type” (p. 14). Arguments within any field can be 
judged by standards appropriate within that field and that the merits to be demanded of an 
argument in one field will be found to be absent from entirely meritorious arguments in 
another. In the words of Toulmin (1958), “whether an argument is put forward in 
support of a bare assertion, or a claim to knowledge, in either case its adequacy will be a 
logical question: the fact that in the second case the assertion is made under cover of a 
claim to authority and reliability (‘I know that…’) makes no serious difference to the 
standards for judging the argument in its support” (p. 246). 
Social Representations Theory 
Social Representations Theory (SRT) was first introduced by the French social 
psychologist Serge Moscovici in the 1960s. According to Farr (1984), social 
representations should be seen as a specific way of understanding and communicating 
what we know already. They are connectors between image and meaning. In society, 
there is a continual need to reconstitute "common sense" that makes sense of images and 
meaning. Thus, social representations are a cognitive system at the social level that 
enables the organization and interpretation of reality (Nicolini, 1999). Moscovici based 
his theory of social representations on the notion of Durkheim’s collective 
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representations. For Durkheim (1898), collective representations were used to describe 
shared understanding or thought by individuals within a society that encompass general 
categories  that include elements such as science, ideology and worldviews. According to 
Durkheim’s view of collective representations, the understanding shared by individuals 
refers to a form of knowledge that is produced by a single source of authority, that is 
strongly resistant to change and that functions to bind societies together. It is on this point 
that Moscovici’s social representations diverge from Durkheim’s conceptualization. 
Moscovici (1988) makes clear that  “It seems to be an aberration, in any case, to 
consider representations as homogeneous and shared as such by a whole society. What 
we wished to emphasize by giving up the word collective was this plurality of 
representations and their diversity within a group” (p. 219). In other words, social 
representations help us make sense of our world and to interact within it with other 
members of society. In this context, Moscovici defined social representations as “a 
system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order 
which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world 
and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the 
members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code 
for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their 
individual and group history” (p. 214). 
One way of representing the dynamics through which people confer meaning to 
situations with others is given by the semiotic triangle representing the interactions taking 







Figure 4 - Semiotic Triangle for Social Representations 
According to Moscovici (1984), “ social representations should be seen as a specific way 
of understanding and communicating what we know already. They are connectors 
between image and meaning. In society there is a continual need to reconstitute "common 
sense" that makes sense of images and meaning” (p. 17).  In this context, we can think of 
social representations as dynamic structures continuously changing through the 
interactions of individuals within societies (Jung et al., 2009). 
Anchoring and Objectification 
 
Since Social Representations Theory (SRT) focuses on the organization and structuring 
of common sense knowledge, it is important to understand how these processes occur. In 
SRT, the structuring and organization of knowledge happens through Anchoring and 
Objectification, which are the processes that help individuals to form, maintain and 
change representations.  Studying Anchoring and Objectification elucidates the socially 
shared interpretive system that influences social actors’ thoughts and actions (Philogene 
& Deaux, 2001). Marková provides an example of Anchoring and Objectification, when 
she describes the anchoring and objectification process for the concept of democracy in 
totalitarian regimes (Marková, 2000). During totalitarianism, the idea of democracy 






totalitarian regimes are replaced by democratic systems, people form representations of 
democracy by creating themes of oppositional categories like freedom/oppression, 
justice/injustice, and equality/inequality. As they newly experience instances of injustice, 
oppression, non-equality, in their daily life, they objectify the idea of democracy, fix it 
and concretize it in new conditions. An example that highlights the evolution of the 
concept of democracy is suffrage, or the right to vote, for women. For instance, in the 
United States, the right to vote for a woman was not originally seen as a key component 
of democracy. However, as society evolved, the perceived inequality between men and 
women became evident, and thus it affected the core concept of democracy. It is now 
well understood that in a free society, all citizens, regardless of their race or gender, 
possess equal rights.  
Anchoring takes place when individuals are faced with new and unfamiliar 
phenomena. It is during the anchoring process that unfamiliar objects are classified and 
named by comparing them with familiar categories (Moscovici, 1984). Anchoring is a 
dynamic process that involves the comparison, evaluation and integration of new and 
unfamiliar phenomena into existing knowledge. According to Molinari and Emiliani 
(Molinari & Emiliani, 1996), the process of anchoring accounts for the integration of 
knowledge in terms of classification and denomination within well-known categories, the 
allocation of meaning to all the elements of a representation (both central and peripheral), 
and the instrumentality of knowledge. The process of anchoring can be further classified 
in three categories, Psychological Anchoring, Sociological Anchoring, and Psychosocial 
Anchoring (Doise, 1992). Psychological Anchoring is described as the link between the 
opinions expressed towards actual practices and the more general knowledge of the same 
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topic; for example, how much a mother feels she can influence the intellectual 
development of her child and what she thinks in general about cognitive development. 
Sociological Anchoring is at work when knowledge or representations are molded by the 
social insertions of groups of subjects such as being a housewife, an office worker, or a 
teacher. Psychosocial anchoring takes into account sociocognitive functioning and social 
dynamics. In this case, social representations are regulated by the identity dynamics due 
to the assumption of multiple social roles (as, for example, being at the same time a 
mother and a teacher). 
Every process of anchoring also involves objectification, formation of new 
meaning of the phenomenon in question. While anchoring is a dynamic process that relies 
primarily on the individual’s experience and memory in classifying and naming newly 
understood and newly experienced phenomena, objectification, on the other hand, is 
primarily a sense-making activity in which the individual, on the basis of his or her 
interpretation of events in the outside world, reconstructs the existing contents of 
representations, creates new ones, and gives meanings to these new contents (Marková, 
2000). Moscovici associates the concept of objectification with fixation or concretization 
of an idea: what originally was perceived becomes conceived (Moscovici, 1984). For 
example, many religions endow the abstract idea of God with concrete meaning by using 
an analogy of God as “father,” which provides devotes with more real and tangible 
experience (Byford, 2002).  Anchoring and objectification are key to social 
representations since they contribute to emergence, reproduction, and transformation of 
social representations over time (Orfali, 2002).  
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Structure of Social Representations 
Social representations, through the processes of anchoring and objectification, develop a 
conceptual network or structure that describes the common sense knowledge acquired by 
the individuals within society. A popular representation of the structure of social 
representations is provided by the concept of core/periphery (Abric, 1993). Abric 
proposes that social representations are internally organized into two systems, a central 
system or core, and a periphery system. The central system, or core, is composed of one 
or a small number of cognitive elements that are responsible for the stability, rigidity and 
consensuality of the representation. These elements are closely tied to the collective 
memory and to the history of a social group, resistant to change and least sensitive to 
variable social contexts. The central core, or attitudinal component, provides a generating 
function through which the other elements acquire meaning and value (Abric, 2001). The 
peripheral system is organized around the central core, and it is composed by all the 
elements of the representation which allow for mobility, flexibility and inter-individual 
differences (Abric, 2001). Thus, it provides the integration of individual experiences and 
histories, and supports the evolution, contradictions and heterogeneity of a particular 
social group. Since the periphery elements are by definition more sensitive to changes in 
context, they work as an isolation system for the central core, protecting it from 
circumstantial transformations in social practices (Flament, 1994). The core/periphery 
model is used to analyze social representations and identify the core concepts of a 
particular phenomenon of interest. In this work, Social Representations are used to 
determine the core and peripheral concepts that represent the IS community’s shared 
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
COLLECTION 
 
This chapter describes the research methods as well as the data collection methodology 
employed in this work. The main two research methods used in this dissertation are 
argument mapping, which is based on Toulmin’s uses of arguments and social 
representations, as described in the previous chapter. Both methodologies fit within the 
qualitative paradigm, although data collected through social representation is analyzed 
with a quantitative technique, i.e., measure of coreness, which will be described in depth 
in subsequent sections.  In addition, a survey of companies engaged in outsourcing 
arrangements was performed in collaboration with the Cutter Consortium to better 
understand client-vendor relationships and the usage of Outsourcing Management Tools.  
This chapter is organized as follows: First, a discussion of the methodological 
approach to this work is presented along with the concept of triangulation in the context 
of qualitative research. Second, Argument Mapping is described, followed by a 
discussion of the data collection, and data analysis processes for this methodology. Third, 
data collection and data analysis for Social Representations is covered. Finally, a 
description of the data collection process for the analysis of ORM tools is presented along 
with the details of the client-vendor survey performed with the Cutter Consortium.  
Methodological Approach  
Qualitative research can be performed through a multiplicity of perspectives and 
methodologies that help the researcher study things in their natural settings as they 
attempt to make sense or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
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them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Given the multiple methodologies and perspectives that 
can be used to do qualitative research, it is difficult to define. According to Mason 
(Mason, 2002), all qualitative research shares three main characteristics: 
• Grounded in a philosophical perspective that it is mainly interpretivist in the sense 
that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, produced 
or constituted; 
• Based on methods of data collection, which are both flexible and sensitive to the 
social context in which the data are produced; and 
• Based on methods of analysis, explanation and argument building, which involve 
understandings of complexity, detail and context. 
 
As noted above, this work relies upon multiple methods to gain a better 
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance. The underlying motivation comes from the 
concept of triangulation of data, which implies the use of multiple methods in order to 
gain a better understanding of the phenomenon in question (Mason, 2002).  Positivistic 
studies undertake triangulation to validate or quantify the phenomenon in question. In the 
quantitative tradition, triangulation is used to determine validity (convergent and 
discriminant) and conflicting results are problematic. In qualitative research, conflicting 
results do not subtract validity, but instead add insights to our understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation. According to the interpretivist philosophy upon which 
qualitative research is based, objective reality can never be captured; instead, we only 
know a thing through its representations.  Thus, researchers often rely on triangulation as 
an alternative to validation, not as a tool or strategy of validation (Flick, 2002). 
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The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, 
perspectives and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as a strategy that 
adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to inquiry. Richardson and Adams 
St. Pierre (2005) claim that instead of the concept of triangulation, qualitative inquiry is 
best represented by a crystal. A crystal is multifaceted, it reflects externalities, but it also 
refracts within itself, creating in this way unique views of the world. The multiple 
methodological approach is applied in this work through the use of three techniques: 
Argument Mapping, Social Representations (core/periphery analysis), and the client-
vendor relationship survey that was performed in collaboration with the Cutter 
Consortium. These methodologies are discussed in the following sections.  
Argument Mapping  
As previously described in Chapter 3, Toulmin identified the different components of 
arguments used by people who assert something they want others to believe. Fletcher and 
Huff (1990) built on this theory to develop Argument Mapping, a diagrammatic form that 
illustrates the interrelationship among components of arguments, which can be used to 
graphically analyze the merits of an argument. Argument Mapping is a technique based 
on the theory of informal logic that treats arguments as rhetorical acts intended to 
persuade others (Pawlowski et al., 2008). This method involves dividing documents into 
topic blocks, subdividing the blocks into discrete arguments, and then identifying the 
components of each argument. The resulting structures of arguments can be graphically 
depicted in a way that summarizes the major points made by the author. 
 Argument mapping was selected as a primary methodology for two reasons: 
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1. Argument Mapping provides a logically consistent methodology to analyze 
discourse through the lens of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which 
allows us to critically examine the structure of this discourse. Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action provides the philosophical foundation for this work.  
 
2. Argument Mapping fits with the type of informal logic and practical reasoning 
typically involved in the group discourse and decision making surrounding the 
implementation of outsourcing arrangements in an organization.   
In order to properly develop argument maps, the different components of an argument 
must be identified in order to understand the validity2 of the argument. A brief 
description of each component of an argument is provided below. 
Components of an Argument 
• Key Claims: According to Toulmin, the claim is “the explicit appeal produced by 
the argument, and is always of a potential controversial nature.” In other words, a 
claim is a statement advanced for others to believe (Fletcher & Huff, 1990). 
• Grounds: Are evidence produced in support of a claim and are given in answer to 
the question, “What do you have to go on? The general format is: “Given these 
GROUNDS, I assert that this CLAIM is true.”  It is important to highlight that 
grounds are identified on the basis of their primary function within the context of 
the argument since the validity of a ground is context dependent. 
• Warrants: These show the logical connection between claim and grounds. 
Warrants answer the question: How did you get from these grounds to that claim? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!According to Toulmin, an argument is valid if it is properly formed. 
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(Toulmin, 1958). Warrants present the problems that are often implicit in the 
argument, in which case the coder must infer the warrant that connects grounds 
with a particular claim (Fletcher & Huff, 1990). 
• Qualifiers: Are used to communicate the degree to which we are to accept the 
claim as true. Qualifiers may reflect genuine doubts on the part of the speaker 
regarding a particular claim. 
• Rebuttals:  These statements manage potential objections by stating conditions 
under which the claim might hold or not hold. 
Argument mapping thus provides a formal method to deconstruct an argument for further 
analysis and inspection that serves as the foundation for discourse analysis of existing 
literature in the IT Outsourcing Governance area. As it is the case with all discourse 
analysis tools, the results of the application of Argument Mapping will only be relevant if 
the data collection and data analysis processes are exhaustive and rigorous. The following 
sections describe the procedures of data collection and analysis performed in this work.   
Data Collection for Argument Mapping 
In order to capture the different views and practices in outsourcing governance, a 
comprehensive literature review was undertaken covering 30+ sources, including 
academic journals from several disciplines (Information Systems, Management, Applied 
Management), academic and practitioner conference papers, trade publications, and 
practitioner journals. Although practitioner’s outlets were including in the literature pool, 
the focus of the study is the understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance in the academic 
community. Practitioner’s reports were used solely to determine if they contributed any 
new claims, or grounds to the discourse. The practitioner literature reviewed in this work 
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did not produce new claims or inconsistent results when compared with the results found 
in the academic literature review. The full list of journals is available in Table!1. To 
ensure that the literature review was as exhaustive as possible, while keeping it 
manageable, a broad search was conducted using a set of keywords as the only delimiters 
of the search. The keywords used as the root were: “Outsourcing Governance,” 
“Outsourcing Relationship Management,” and “IT Governance.” Once all articles from 
the different sources were compiled, a filtering process began in which the articles were 
reviewed for relevant content. An analysis of abstracts worked as the first filter, with a 
more thorough review of articles as a second filter. The filtering process produced 73 
articles that were deemed relevant and used for the creation of argument maps.  
 
Table 1 - List of Journals 
Academic Journals 
IS Journals Management Journals 
Information & Organization  Academy of Management Review (AMR) 
Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) 
Communications of the Association for Computing 
Machinery (CACM) Decision Sciences (DS) 
European Journal of Information Systems (EJIS) Management Science (MS) 
Journal of Information Technology (JIT) Organization Science (OS) 
Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS) Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) 
Information & Management (I&M) 
Applied Management Journals 
Information Systems Journal (ISJ) 
Information Systems Research (ISR) Harvard Business Review (HBR) 
Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ) California Management Review (CMR) 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
(JAIS) Sloan Management Review (SLR) 
Communications of the Association for Information 
Systems (CAIS) IS Academic Conferences 
  International Conference of Information Systems (ICIS) 
  Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 
  AMCIS 
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Table 1 - Continued 
Trade Journals 
IBM Systems Journal Global Services 
!! !!
CIO Magazine Information Week 
Publications from Professional organizations 
Global Services Media Outsourcing Institute 
IAOP Sourcing Interests Group 
ITGI The Global Sourcing Council 
Publications from Consultant Organizations 
Gartner Equaterra 
TPI   
 
Argument Mapping - Data Analysis 
Argument Mapping was employed to analyze the wealth of data acquired during the data 
collection stage. The use of Argument Mapping enables the evaluation of assertions 
brought forward to support a particular argument. In the context of IT Outsourcing 
Governance, the development of argument maps allow for the evaluation of different 
views of governance by providing a structure that succinctly illuminates and summarizes 
unsupported claims, potential pitfalls, and counterclaims that may be overlooked in a 
simple literature review or that may be hidden in the rhetoric of a paper.  
The analysis of arguments in this work is based on Toulmin’s technique 
(discussed in Chapter 3) coupled with Fletcher and Huff’s (1990) graphical 
representation of arguments to develop graphical argument maps that are easily 
interpreted by the reader. Clusters of similar claims from the various papers, which are 
assumed to underlie a common phenomenon, will be grouped in separate maps. In this 
way, the different dimensions of outsourcing governance will be elucidated through 
detailed inspection of the literature.  
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In order to complete the argument mapping process, Fletcher and Huff (1990) suggest 
multiple passes through the material to be coded, moving from the general to the specific 
with each pass. These stages are described as follows: 
• First Pass: Read through the whole document, identifying topics, arguments, and the 
most obvious key claims. 
• Second Pass: Mark all claims, and identify grounds for each claim. 
• Third Pass: Within each argument, identify sub claims, elaborations and reiterations. 
• Fourth Pass: Provide implicit warrants wherever they are not obvious. 
 
Thus, four passes were performed on every article, and an example of the process is 
provided in Appendix F. Once all claims were identified, similar claims were grouped 
into an aggregate claim that depicts the commonality between them. This process is 
repeated for sub claims, grounds, warrants, qualifiers and counter claims (rebuttals). This 
modification to Fletcher and Huff’s methodology allows for the representation of 
complex arguments from different sources (articles) in a succinct, more easily understood 
map. 
The main claims identified in the argument maps, which represent the different 
dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance, became the base for the development of the 
comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing Governance described in the Results 
section. Argument Mapping is a very useful discourse analysis tool, but its results are 
limited by the content and extent of the existing literature. Thus, in order to gain further 
insights into how academics and practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance, 




Social representation research has been carried out with a multiplicity of methodological 
approaches including cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, and multidimensional 
scaling. In addition to these techniques, there are methods that were specifically 
developed to better understand the structure of social representations, such as the analysis 
of similarity designed by Flament (1986). This study follows the methodology used by 
Jung, Pawlowski and Wiley-Paton (Jung et al., 2009), who based their study of the 
structure of social representations on the core-periphery analysis described by Abric 
(Abric, 2001). Abric proposed a structural approach, which is a direct extension of the 
theory elaborated by Moscovici (1961), which enables the identification of the set of 
stable concepts that constitute the very nature of the representation (core) and more 
flexible contents that can changed over time or context (periphery). This methodology 
mainly consists of two parts, eliciting social representations from respondents, and the 
analysis of social representations (finding core-periphery structure) (Jung et al., 2009). 
The selection of Social Representation Theory (SRT) and core/periphery analysis 
as a methodology for this work is based on its logical consistency with Habermas’ 
Theory of Communicative Action, and Toulmin’s Informal Logic. At the foundation of 
SRT is the assumption that social representations are constructed through social 
interaction (anchoring and objectification). The validity of claims, or the force of the 
better argument, will be reflected by the continuous process of objectification and 
anchoring that determine the core elements of a representation. Therefore, the selection of 
SRT is completely aligned with the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of 
this work. 
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Data Collection for Social Representations 
Social representations can be elicited through a variety of methods such as interviews, 
focus groups, content analysis of documents, and free word association, to name a few. 
The criteria for choosing a particular data collection method primarily depends on 
research design considerations, as well as practical limitations that might hinder the data 
collection capabilities of the researcher (e.g. time, cost, access to participants, etc.) (Jung 
et al., 2009). Considering the constraints (time and access to participants) involved in 
data collection in the present study, free word association online survey was chosen as 
the data collection method. This method was determined to be best suited to this study 
because study participants would be required to spend just a short period of time to 
complete the survey, thus increasing the likelihood that participants would respond to the 
survey, and the relative ease of the data analysis process since unlike interviews, the 
results of a free word association survey do not need to be transcribed prior to coding.  
It is worth mentioning that not all techniques of data collection are equivalent, and 
depending on the purpose of the research, free word association might not be the 
appropriate approach, regardless of its apparent advantages. Since the purpose of social 
representation theory is to elicit core elements of a particular object or concept (Abric, 
2001) it is important that the data collection method does not introduce any bias. In the 
case of free word association, the lack of elaboration in the responses (usually limited to a 
single word or short sentence) could lead to the researcher misrepresenting the meaning 
of underlying responses of the subjects (Jung et al., 2009). In this study, the possibility of 
misrepresentation of underlying concepts is greatly reduced by the development of a 
conceptual framework of IT Outsourcing Governance derived from argument maps based 
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on relevant literature. Another possible source of bias in social representations is caused 
by the addition of “cues” for the subjects to stimulate associations to other concepts. 
These cues are usually in the form of a definition or a sentence related to the main 
concept of interest that will facilitate the job of the respondents. In the case of this study, 
no such definition was provided because there is not a widely accepted definition of IT 
Outsourcing Governance and, more importantly, the main purpose of this research is to 
capture the different interpretations of the concept in order to capture the multiple 
dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance without biasing the participants with a 
particular definition.  
The instrument used in this study was an online-based survey that asked 
participants to write down three words or phrases that came to mind when hearing the 
term “IT Outsourcing Governance.” The population of interest for this survey was IT 
Professionals with experience in outsourcing and Academics deemed experts in the field 
as evidenced by their track record in publications related to Outsourcing. A total of 60 
subjects completed the study with 31 responses from academics and 29 responses from 
IT Professionals. The instrument used, along with other details such as years of 
experience in the field of the participants, is provided in Appendix A. The data analysis 
process for Social Representations (described in detail below) included open coding 
technique to identify relevant topics, and core periphery/analysis to elicit how 
practitioners and academics conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance.  
Data Analysis for Social Representations 
The data analysis process began with the detailed coding of each word/phrase elicited 
from the participants and identification of key topics (concepts). The responses to the 
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survey were coded using open coding, which is a coding procedure in which codes are 
not predetermined, but rather emerge from the data. This process resulted in 48 initial 
codes that captured the responses of all participants of the survey (e.g. C1 Relationship 
Management, C19 Academia, C12 Accountability, etc.). For example, “accountability,” 
“decision rights” and “responsibility” were assigned to code C12 Accountability. Once 
the responses to the survey from the 60 participants were grouped into the 48 initial 
codes, a second reviewer was given the set of codes and responses identified by the first 
reviewer. The second reviewer then proceeded to allocate responses to the codes 
originally identified. The two raters were in agreement on 152 out of the 180 responses to 
the survey (each of the 60 subjects provided three words), with a high inter-rater 
reliability level (Kohen’s Kappa) of 0.837 (Fleiss, 1981) and a consistency rate of 0.844. 
Inter-rater disagreements were then reconciled through discussion and consensus. Finally, 
related codes were grouped into 20 topics (super-codes), as shown in Table!2.  
Analysis of the Structure of the Social Representation 
With all responses grouped into relevant topics, a core-periphery analysis was performed 
in order to elicit the core concepts that underlie the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing 
Governance. The criteria for determining core elements of a social representation were 
laid out by Abric (2001). According to Abric, a core element can be determined on the 
basis of symbolic value, expressive value, and associative value. Symbolic value is based 
on the concept that central elements cannot be questioned or changed without affecting 
the signification, or meaning, of the entire representation. Expressive value comes from 
the assumption that central elements will be more frequently present than peripheral 
elements in the discourse concerning the object than the peripheral elements. 
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Table 2 - Topics of Social Representations of ITOG 
Topics Example Answers 
T1 Relationship Management Relationship, Relationship Management 
T2 Contract Management Contracts, Contract Management 
T3 Conflict Resolution Conflict Management, Conflicts 
T4 Performance Control Control Mechanism, Oversight, Costs 
T5 Organizational Capability Internal Capabilities, Client/Vendor Capabilities 
T6 Difficult to Implement Complex, Difficult 
T7 General Management Management, Managed Services 
T8 Communication Communication 
T9 Psychological Contract Trust, Ethics, Expectations 
T10 
Internal Organizational 
Structure Organizational Structure, Constitution 
T11 Inter-organizational Structure 
Formalized Interaction Structures, Management 
Structure 
T12 Accountability Accountability, Responsibility, Decision Rights 
T13 Policies Policies, Rules of Engagement, Guidelines 
T14 Outsourcing Management 
Management Sourcing, Outsourcing Activities 
Portfolio Management 
T15 Academic Topic Curriculum, Research 
T16 Important for Business Critical for Success, Important 
T17 Human Resources Management Knowledge Transfer, Attrition, Skills, Experience 
T18 Service Quality Service Levels, Reliability 
T19 Partnership Quality Partnership, Partnership Quality 
T20 Security Data Security, Security 
 
Finally, associative value is established on the premise that central elements must be 
associated with a larger number of elements than the periphery ones. In the current study, 
only expressive and associative values were assessed. Symbolic value could not be 
assessed in this study, as its assessment requires additional research settings such as 
longitudinal studies, which are beyond the scope of this work.  
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The core/periphery analysis, along with the assessment of expressive and 
associative values, was performed separately for academics and practitioners in order to 
elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance between 
populations. Since social representations are shaped by societal interactions, it is worth 
exploring how two different groups - academics and practitioners - conceptualize IT 
Outsourcing Governance. Expressive value was measured by computing frequencies of 
appearance of elements (topics) in the responses (Abric, 2001; Nicolini, 1999). 
Associative value was assessed via sum of similarity. The fundamental component of the 
analysis is the development of an inter-attribute similarity (IAS) matrix in which each 
cell contains a Jaccard’s similarity coefficient, indicating the degree of co-occurrence 
(proximity) for a given pair of attributes (Jung et al., 2009). Sum of similarity is 
calculated as a sum of the similarities of each element (topic) to all others in the IAS 
matrix shown in Appendix B. The higher sum of similarity a topic has, the closer 
association or proximity it has with the other topics. 
Social Representations, coupled with Argument Mapping, provide insights into 
the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance. This conceptualization can now be 
used to analyze different aspects of an IT outsourcing arrangement. One such aspect is 
the management of the client-vendor relationship. This work focuses on the use of 
Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) Tools that are designed to facilitate the 
management of outsourcing arrangements. In the next section, the data collection strategy 
to study ORM tools, along with the client-vendor survey performed in collaboration with 
the Cutter Consortium, are described. 
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Data Collection for Outsourcing Relationship Management Tools  
The widespread adoption of outsourcing arrangements has led to the development of 
tools specifically designed to aid in the management of outsourcing relationships.  These 
tools collectively are called Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM), and offer 
monitoring capabilities and analytics tools that organizations utilize to measure the 
performance of the outsourcing arrangement.  
The market currently offers a large number of ORM software packages. In order 
to keep this work manageable, the list of tools selected for analysis closely follows the 
report created by the International Association of Outsourcing Professionals (IAOP, 
2011), which includes the following tools: Janeeva, Enlighta. EquaSiis, and Hiperos. It is 
worth mentioning that the list analyzed in this work is a subset of the tools listed in the 
IAOP report covering tools specifically designed for the management of outsourcing 
relationships. Two other tools were originally included in the study and later removed 
from the data set due to changes in functionality and accessibility for analysis. These 
tools were Oblicore and Digital Fuel, which ranked amongst the most popular tools in the 
market in the last decade. Oblicore, which among its clients featured AT&T and 
Chrysler, was acquired by CA Technologies in January 2010 and has been repackaged as 
part of CA Technology. The acquisition bolstered the IT management offerings of CA 
Technologies but it made accessing Oblicore’s tools more difficult. CA Technologies has 
integrated Oblicore’s functionality into its offerings with a prominent focus on SLA 
management, and has been rebranded as CA Business Service Insight (formerly known as 
Oblicore Guarantee). Digital Fuel was founded in the year 2000 and specialized in SLA 
management and IT financial management deployed as SaaS solutions that plan, bill, and 
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optimize IT cost and value. In June 2011, VMWare acquired Digital Fuel in order to 
boost VMware management portfolio. Among Digital Fuel’s clients were IBM, Telus, 
Volkswagen and Wipro. 
In order to evaluate each tool, user accounts were created (when a free demo was 
available), feature lists were compiled, and user manuals were downloaded to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the capabilities of each tool. A brief description of each 
tool is provided below. In order to help the reader visualize better the tools, Appendix G 
provides sample screen shots that highlight the interface elements of some of these tools. 
Janeeva (www.janeeva.com) 
Janeeva is one of the most complete ORM tools on the market. Founded in 2004, Janeeva 
has experienced dramatic growth through partnerships and acquisitions. In 2007, Janeeva 
partnered with Syntel, a leading global provider of integrated information technology and 
knowledge process outsourcing, in order to improve its offerings in the risk and 
compliance areas.  
Janeeva provides a one-stop shop for governance activities of outsourced 
operations. According to Janeeva’s website, “with Janeeva, governance groups, 
providers and internal customers know exactly where to go to arrange for additional 
resources, raise or manage an issue, track SLAs, or compare performance across 
multiple providers.” Janeeva is one of the most feature-rich ORM tools analyzed and it is 
offered as subscription-based Software as a Service (SaaS), providing the scalability and 
flexibility associated with cloud-based solutions. Janeeva’s flagship product is called 
Janeeva Assurance, and its customers include Fortune 100 financial services, healthcare 
and pharmaceutical companies. 
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Enlighta Govern (www.enlighta.com) 
Enlighta has been in business since March 2002 and offers a broad set of services. Its 
flagship product is called Enlighta Govern and it includes a comprehensive set of features 
for Outsourcing Governance that makes it a very complete ORM solution. Enlighta 
solutions have been deployed at more than 2,000 companies for managing and governing 
global services delivery, application support, back-office services, contact centers, etc. 
Enlighta’s mission is to provide organizations with easy to use, highly adaptable software 
solutions that can be licensed, implemented, deployed and supported at a fraction of the 
cost of typical enterprise applications. 
Enlighta uses metadata in order to aggregate data from multiple sources (email, 
excel, ticketing systems, etc.), providing a holistic view of the outsourcing arrangement 
to the user. The ability to aggregate data using metadata facilitates the decision making 
process through the creation of executive dashboards that provide customized 
information for senior management. In addition, Enlighta Web-Services API makes it 
easy to integrate with existing tools, such as BMC Remedy and HP OpenView for 
information feeds.  
Enlighta is offered as SaaS or it can be locally deployed in the client-servers. This 
flexibility addresses the issues of privacy and security, which are among the most 
common concerns when adopting cloud-based solutions. 
EquaSiis (www.equasiis.com) 
EquaSiis was formed in 2009 as a wholly owned company by EquaTerra, and focused on 
market intelligence and improving operational performance of companies through the use 
software and tools to manage outsourcing arrangements.  
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EquaSiis has continuously evolved to become an ORM solution that supports 
outsourcing governance teams, shared services organizations, and teams managing 
complex business and IT services and vendors. It provides a rich and highly configurable 
set of tools and services that facilitate relationship management by automating the 
transactional components of operational governance, while also providing decision-
making support for more strategic work. One of the most appealing features of EquaSiis 
is its integration with Microsoft products (Office, Outlook, SharePoint, etc.), which not 
only facilitates adoption and utilization, but it also promotes collaboration between 
parties.  In 2011, EquaTerra, the parent company of EquaSiis, was acquired by KPMG. 
This acquisition was performed in order to extend KPMG’s offerings and provide current 
EquaSiis’ clients with access to expanded services, capabilities and support from a 
leading global audit, tax and advisory network. At the time of this writing, EquaSiis is 
still marketed with the same name but its website is now redirecting users to a new site 
hosted by KPMG. 
Hiperos (www.hiperos.com) 
Hiperos, founded in 2006, is a highly customizable ORM tool offered as SaaS. Hiperos 
has been designed from the ground up to support processes and controls that ensure 
activities taking place outside a company’s four walls can be managed just as effectively 
as those being performed internally. Hiperos list of customers includes MasterCard, 
United Technologies and Microsoft. 
There is a marked emphasis on collaboration and sharing of information within 
Hiperos that goes beyond the automation of functions and processes. Hiperos provides an 
integrated platform that includes active content (KPI libraries, regulatory compliance 
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checklists) and an interactive community. The platform allows all key stakeholders to 
manage and monitor performance, compliance, sustainability, risk and corporate social 
responsibility through the creation of customized programs or views. The platform also 
allows all stakeholders to share best practices with each other, in addition to external 
colleagues, and peer companies.  
The previously described tools provide an overview of the functionality that is 
available to managers that decide to use ORM tools to manage their sourcing 
arrangements. However, in order to better understand how practitioners manage 
outsourcing arrangements, and to discover the level of adoption of ORM tools in practice, 
a more thorough study is needed. Therefore, a survey was carried out in collaboration 
with the Cutter Consortium (described below) to better understand the client-vendor 
relationship and the adoption of ORM tools. 
Client-Vendor Relationship Survey 
In addition to the analysis of individual ORM tools, a survey was carried out in 
collaboration with Cutter Consortium (Hirschheim et al., 2009) in order to better 
understand client-vendor relationships and the adoption levels of ORM tools in industry. 
Understanding the client-vendor relationship, and how outsourcing arrangements are 
managed, can provide insights into the adoption of ORM tools. Traditional management 
tools, such as formal progress reports, milestone reviews, or scorecards, are tools that 
have been used in project management for decades. However, this approach can easily 
break down when the information available to a manager is no longer current. Thus, 
utilizing traditional management tools that were not designed to enhance real-time 
communication between parties could seriously hinder the success of a relationship. In 
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this context, ORM tools might provide the necessary functionality that could allow 
clients and vendors to build a successful relationship.  
The surveyed companies included in the study varied in size from 100 to 50,000+ 
employees, with IT budgets ranging from less than $100,000 (11%) to more than $100 
million (9%). Fifty-one percent of the respondents hold senior management/policy 
making or IS/IT management titles; 22% hold project management titles; and consulting, 
software engineering/programming, and marketing/sales are among the other titles held. 
The full results and demographics of the survey are available in Appendix D.!
!  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, a framework for IT Outsourcing Governance is derived from the literature 
using the technique of Argument Mapping. In addition, the results of a social 
representation study of IT Outsourcing Governance are compared to the literature-based 
framework in order to elicit possible gaps in our understanding of IT Outsourcing 
Governance. Finally, the findings from the analysis of ORM tools are presented. 
Argument Maps  
The literature review of IT Outsourcing Governance was used to create Argument Maps, 
which were used to elicit the perceived nature of this phenomenon within our field. A key 
finding is that the IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management are often 
used interchangeably in the literature. This is depicted in the argument maps included in 
Appendix E. Likewise, four main dimensions emerged as key components of IT 
Outsourcing Governance: Partnership Quality, Service Quality, Conflict Resolution, and 
Formal and Informal Control (Dual Nature of the Relationship).   Each of these 
dimensions was further studied by performing an in-depth literature review with 
corresponding argument maps for each. This process yielded a set of sub-dimensions for 
IT Outsourcing Governance that relate back to the main dimensions previously identified. 
A summary of the various dimensions and sub-dimensions can be found in Figure!5, 
while the detailed argument maps can be found in Appendix E. 
In order to better understand the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance, 
a discussion of each dimension is provided below.  
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Figure 5 - IT Outsourcing Governance Dimensions 
IT Outsourcing Governance – Relationship Management 
During the literature review process, it was observed that the terms “outsourcing 
governance” and “relationship management” were used, by and large, in an 
interchangeable fashion (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Gewald & 
Helbig, 2006; Klepper, 1995). Furthermore, the few definitions that exist for IT 
Outsourcing Governance all emphasize that, in addition to structure and decision rights, 
IT Outsourcing Governance involves relationship management (Meng et al., 2006; 
Simmons, 2005), thus contributing to making the boundaries between IT Outsourcing 
Governance and relationship management even fuzzier.   
This apparent confusion of terms was a puzzling finding that was difficult to 



























nature of the concepts of IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management. IT 
Outsourcing Governance is often described as an extension of the definition of 
governance, which defines decision rights, accountability, and hierarchy within an 
organization, whereas Relationship Management is associated with the management of 
interactions between client and vendor. 
On the surface, it seems that these two concepts should not be confused. IT 
Outsourcing Governance relates to the structure or scaffolding for the relationship, while 
Relationship Management deals with the management of the relationship. However, IT 
Outsourcing Governance is different from its close relative, “governance.” Unlike 
governance, IT Outsourcing Governance cannot exist if there is no relationship between 
client and vendor (Relationship Management), and at the same time, a relationship 
between client and vendor cannot prosper without the establishment of decision rights 
and accountability (IT Outsourcing Governance). This apparent mutual dependence 
between IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management will be discussed 
further in this section. What appears to be the case is that this seeming interrelationship is 
actually due to the dual nature of IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship 
Management, and that the results in the literature reflect such duality. 
Partnership Quality 
Partnership Quality is considered one of the main factors related to outsourcing success 
and proper governance of the client-vendor relationship (Bennett & Sayers, 1994; Beulen 
& Ribbers, 2002). Moreover, Lee and Kim (Lee & Kim, 1999b) claim that “Partnership 
quality is not only critical to assure high-quality partnership, but also a key predictor for 
managing outsourcing for user and business satisfaction” (p. 53). Partnering 
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relationships hold potential benefits for both client and vendors but are usually difficult to 
develop, and maintaining a good partnership can be costly due to the fact that an 
outsourcing relationship is not a static challenge, but a dynamic process involving 
communication, interaction, and change (Klepper, 1995; Lee & Kim, 2003). 
Consequently, three main factors or dimensions, Psychological Contract, 
Communication, and Trust were found to be particularly relevant to the concept of 
Partnership Quality. These three sub-dimensions are discussed below. 
Psychological Contract 
The psychological contract is a key factor for partnership quality and outsourcing 
success. IT Outsourcing Governance can be construed as a social exchange relationship 
involving cooperation of the parties to achieve an agreed-upon goal. This agreement 
normally takes the form of a legal contract in which mutual obligations are specified. In 
this context, the vendor agrees to make specific contributions to the client in return for 
certain benefits from the client. However, since written obligations can never be complete 
due to the unpredictability of the market, contracts must be supplemented by unwritten 
promises (Macneil, 1980). These obligations extend beyond mere expectations and are 
based on the perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange (Koh et al., 2004). 
One of the main researchers of psychological contracts is Denis Rousseau, who 
has defined a psychological contract as “people’s mental beliefs and expectations about 
their mutual obligations in a contractual relation”(Rousseau, 1995). Since it is 
impossible to include all conditions in the legal contract, the parties often rely on the 
spirit of the contract as embodied in a handshake. Ultimately, it is the individual’s beliefs 
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and perceptions of his/her obligations, rather than the actual written contract that drive 
behavior (Rousseau, 1995). 
In order to better understand the mutual expectations that are developed in a 
client-vendor relationship, Koh et al. (2004) carried out a sequential qualitative-
quantitative study that provides a summary of the perceived customer and supplier 
obligations in a psychological contract. 
Supplier Obligations 
• Accurate project scoping: Define precisely the nature and range of services 
covered in the outsourcing contract, and flexibility in handling customers’ 
requests for changes in these services. 
• Clear authority structures: Delineate the decision-making rights and reporting 
structures in the project, in terms of the roles and responsibilities of all parties 
involved. 
• Taking charge: Complete the job and solve problems independently, with 
minimal customer involvement. 
• Effective human capital management: Assign high-quality staff to work on the 
project, and to minimize staff turnover during the project. 
• Effective knowledge transfer: Educate the customer in terms of the necessary 
skills, knowledge, and expertise associated with using the outsourced system of 
service. 
• Building effective inter-organizational teams: Invest time and effort to foster a 
good working relationship between the team that is comprised of the customer 
and supplier staff who are working on the project. 
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Customer Obligations 
• Clear specifications: Understand and explicitly and comprehensively articulate 
the requirements for the services covered by the outsourcing project. 
• Prompt payment: Pay suppliers on time and not withhold payments unreasonably. 
• Close project monitoring: Be actively involved in overseeing the project progress 
by attending project meetings and discussions regularly. 
• Dedicated project staffing: Assign key employees who possess the required skills 
and knowledge to work with supplier staff on the project. 
• Knowledge sharing: Provide information required by supplier, and to educate 
supplier with the industry and firm-specific knowledge necessary to build or 
operate the system. 
• Project ownership: Ensure that senior management provides strong leadership, 
support, and commitment toward the project. 
Mutually fulfilled obligations predict success over and above the effects of contract type, 
duration, and size (Koh et al., 2004), thus highlighting the importance of psychological 
contracts for outsourcing arrangements. 
Communication 
Communication plays a fundamental role in clarifying the mutual expectations and 
obligations that clients and vendors harbor when they enter a legal and psychological 
contract. According to social exchange theory, effective communication between parties 
is paramount in order to achieve the intended objectives (Lee & Kim, 1999b). Open and 
honest communication should lead to better-informed parties, who in turn, through the 
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communication process, begin building rapport and become more confident with the 
relationship and more willing to keep it alive and healthy.  
The role of Communication in Partnership Quality is not only limited to the 
clarification of mutual expectations, but also to the growth and fostering of the 
relationship. Clear lines of communication allow partners to freely discuss the progress of 
the project and any management concerns (Bennett & Sayers, 1994; Lee & Kim, 1999b). 
Moreover, the implementation of information management and communication practices 
within the outsourcing company supports the relationship between the outsourcing 
company and the IT-supplier and contributes to the governance of a complex IT-
outsourcing partnership (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002). There are multiple methods for 
promoting healthy lines of communication and effective information management 
(Bennett & Sayers, 1994). These methods encompass holding project kick-off meetings 
to provide orientation and introduce team members, regular status meetings where 
progress is reported and issues raised, keeping detailed minutes that record action items 
and decisions, and developing a documentation plan which includes a project file 
containing relevant materials such as correspondence, comments, etc.  
Another important factor that contributes to effective communication in IT 
Outsourcing Governance is who is involved in the communication acts. Top management 
involvement is often seen as a positive influence for the client-vendor relationship (Lee & 
Kim, 1999b). Perhaps more crucial is the necessity for the people who interface with the 
other party to possess both business and IT knowledge in order to appropriately fulfill 
their duties (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Hirschheim et al., 2009; Kitzis, 1998). Historically, 
there has been a disproportionate focus on negotiation skills and the crafting of formal 
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contracts at the expense of the development of effective communication skills that are 
often considered to be implicitly possessed by both client and vendor and hence over-
looked, particularly at the commencement of the relationship. Organizations must go 
beyond acquiring traditional negotiation skills and move toward developing effective 
trust as well as building communication between parties in order to improve partnership 
quality (Hirschheim et al., 2009; Lee & Kim, 1999b). 
Trust  
The psychological contract and communication between parties in an outsourcing 
arrangement are important determinants of partnership quality. However, one of the main 
factors considered to predict outsourcing success and partnership quality is the concept of 
Trust (Cong & Chau, 2007; Grover et al., 1996; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Lacity et al., 
2009; Lee & Kim, 2003; Lee & Kim, 1999b, 2005). Trust can be described as occurring 
when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994). Thus, in an outsourcing relationship, lack of trust might lead to 
unwillingness from parties to delegate responsibility, and therefore result a subpar 
partnership (Lee & Kim, 2005).  
IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently inter-organizational in nature. As such, 
the parties entering the relationship will try to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by 
means of detail contracts, flexibility clauses, and service level agreements (SLAs) 
(Willcocks et al., 2007). However, due to the uncertainty of market conditions, politics, 
and societal changes, it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty through the use of formal 
methods of control alone. In this context, Trust can help mitigate the extent of uncertainty 
! 71!
that can exist in the inter-organizational relationship by discouraging opportunistic 
behavior among parties (Cong & Chau, 2007). 
In order to foster trust between parties, it is important to develop frequent and 
clear communication, since communication is a necessary antecedent of trust. Trust will 
evolve as the relationship between partners develops, and the commitment to the 
partnership of the parties grows by acting predictably and fairly in the pursuit of common 
goals.  Additionally, striving toward the achievement of mutual benefits increases the 
perception of closeness and trust between parties (Kern & Willcocks, 2000). When 
common goals and benefits are attained, the partnership strengthens and a sense of 
chemistry between client and vendor develops and results in increased trustworthiness 
between parties (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).   
In summary, fostering a cooperative relationship based on trust, business 
understanding, benefit and risk share, and commitment is critical to reap the greatest 
benefits from IT outsourcing. Partnership quality, thus, is not only critical to assure high-
quality partnership, but also a key predictor for managing outsourcing for user and 
business satisfaction (Lee & Kim, 2003; Lee & Kim, 1999b).  
Service Quality 
Service Quality is highly related to Partnership Quality, and as such, some of the factors 
that will foster a beneficial partnership, such as Trust and Communication, will also have 
a positive effect on Service Quality. According to Grover et al. (Grover et al., 1996), 
Service Quality and the establishment of elements of a partnership are important 
determinants of outsourcing success. The perceived quality of a service is highly 
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subjective because services are intangible – they are not things, they are processes. A 
traditional view of Service Quality evaluation contends that consumers tend to compare 
expected service levels with the actual service received in order to assess quality 
(Gronroos, 1983). Because services are fundamentally different from physical goods, the 
evaluation of Service Quality is a contentious issue due to the intangible nature of 
services (Schonberger, 1980). For example, the manner in which a service is performed is 
an integral part of the service involving simultaneous production of the service by the 
vendor, and consumption of said service by the client (Bowen & Schneither, 1988; 
Shostack, 1987). Since most intangible products or services can seldom be tried out, or 
inspected, clients rely on surrogates to evaluate quality of service (Levitt, 1981). In this 
context, the three main dimensions that compose Service Quality were found to be 
Communication, Trust and Satisfaction, and Personnel Involvement. These sub-
dimensions are discussed below. 
Communication 
As previously discussed, effective communication is one of the foundations of a 
successful partnership (Lee & Kim, 1999b). In the context of Service Quality, 
Communication is seen as a fundamental tool for information sharing, and vendor control 
(Mao et al., 2008). Communication is key in clarifying expectations and responsibilities 
for both client and vendor (Bennett & Sayers, 1994). Increasing the depth and range of 
available information by using multiple mediums of communication such as progress 
reports, shared project plans, meetings, and informal communication not specified in the 
contract helps maintain service quality while reducing the opportunity for “slippage” in 
the progress of the project (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Mao et al., 2008).  
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In addition to sharing information, effective communication can promote trust in 
the relationship (Mao et al., 2008).  Regular communication between the outsourcing 
company and the IT-supplier is considered essential in establishing flexible partnerships 
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2007). Although fostering informal communication can help address 
issues not specifically considered in the contract, an organized, multilevel communication 
structure contributes to a flexible IT outsourcing partnership and helps to keep control of 
the sourcing arrangement (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). Therefore, the use of 
Outsourcing Relationship Management tools which can provide a multitude of functions, 
such as a means for shared access between client and vendor, a channel for real time 
communication, or a venue for milestones and deliverables tracking, can positively affect 
Service Quality (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Hirschheim et al., 2009).  
Trust and Satisfaction  
In the context of Service Quality, trust and satisfaction are often mentioned together, and 
thus they are analyzed together as well (Kern & Blois, 2002; Lee & Kim, 1999a). The 
development of Trust between parties has a direct impact on project quality and overall 
satisfaction with the client-vendor relationship (Cong & Chau, 2007; Grover et al., 1996; 
Mao et al., 2008). However, a necessary condition for the development of trust between 
the parties, is Satisfaction with Service Quality, since only through high satisfaction 
levels can confidence in the vendor be built, which ultimately leads to trust (Kern & 
Blois, 2002; Lee & Kim, 1999a). Sabherwal (1999) identified different types of trust in 
client-vendor relationships: 
• Calculus-based Trust: Rooted in rewards and punishment associated with a 
particular project. 
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• Knowledge-based Trust: Depends on the two parties knowing each other well. 
• Identification-based Trust: Occurs when the two parties identify with each other’s 
goals. 
• Performance-based Trust: Depends on early project successes. 
When evaluating Service Quality, Satisfaction with services provided is related to 
confirmation of expectations by comparing the expected service levels with the perceived 
service received (Gronroos, 1983; Smith & Houston, 1983). As previously mentioned, 
the intangible nature of services poses a challenge when attempting to determine Service 
Quality. In this context, understanding customer expectations can greatly increase the 
potential for satisfaction with services provided. Parasuraman et al. (1985) have 
identified reliability, credibility, responsiveness, courtesy, understanding, and 
communication as the main dimensions that comprise consumer expectations for services. 
In addition, Kern and Blois (2002) claimed that in order to improve user satisfaction, 
vendors need to have a greater understanding of their business, show more commitment, 
and should possibly initiate investments beyond the terms stipulated in the original 
contract to ensure that the working relationship is maintained and a partnership is 
fostered. 
To summarize, high satisfaction levels with services provided builds the 
foundation necessary to promote Trust between client and vendors. Since Trust has been 
identified as one of the main predictors of outsourcing success (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; 
Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 1999a, 2003; Lee & Kim, 
2005; Mao et al., 2008) companies should continuously monitor the satisfaction of those 
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receiving IT services in order to maintain a good relationship (Kern & Willcocks, 2000; 
Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003). 
Personnel Involvement 
Another important factor related to Service Quality and outsourcing success is 
determined by the personnel involved in the sourcing relationship. Studies have shown 
that personnel continuity and top management involvement heavily contribute to the 
quality of service provided, and overall satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement 
(Kern & Willcocks, 2002; Koh et al., 2004; Lacity et al., 2009; Lee & Kim, 1999a; 
Quinn, 1999; Zviran et al., 2001).  
Top management commitment has often been identified as an important factor for 
IT Outsourcing success. Senior managers can help by making critical decisions and 
quickly resolve conflicts that might arise in the course of business (Zviran et al., 2001). In 
addition to showing commitment to the relationship, top management involvement also 
helps to deal with situations or issues that are not fully contemplated in the original 
contract and must be resolved through negotiation (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Lacity & 
Willcocks, 1998; Lacity et al., 2009; Quinn, 1999). 
Another important factor affecting Service Quality is personnel continuity. In 
order to maintain and a foster a partnership, organizations should strive to build rapport 
among the personnel involved in the sourcing arrangement. Shifting people off and on the 
project results in discontinuity in the management of the partnership with the consequent 
potential for negative impacts in trust and satisfaction (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002). 
Although fostering a cordial relationship amongst personnel involved in the client-vendor 
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relationship is important, organizations should be aware that if these relationships grow 
too close, the problem of dependency arises, in which only people in the “in-group” 
understand the background and reasons behind decisions made for the project. When 
taken to an extreme, this dependency situation can hinder parties from terminating the 
contract or aggressively negotiating new terms of service due to a sense of loyalty that 
arises from a relationship that moved from a cordial professional interaction to a 
relationship that is closer to friendship (Kern & Willcocks, 2002).  
Because of the imprecise nature of services and the difficulty in assuring 
consistent quality, clients and vendors establish relationships (e.g., partnerships) in an 
effort to better specify service requirements and desired quality levels. In doing so, 
organizations must strike a balance between a cordial working relationship and becoming 
dependent on each other to the point where their decision-making might be compromised.  
Formal and Informal Control 
IT Outsourcing Governance is a complex arrangement that encompasses relationship 
management as well as the establishment of formal structures of control (Simmons, 
2005). Consequently, the implementation of effective formal and informal methods of 
control will have a direct impact on the performance of the outsourcing arrangement 
(Gewald & Helbig, 2006; Hirschheim et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) due to the 
need for well-crafted contracts to clearly define responsibilities and effective relationship 
management that can help foster a partnership and quickly adapt the working relationship 
and the terms of the contract (if necessary) to respond to market changes. The importance 
of implementing both contract management as well as relationship management is 
highlighted by Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994) by claiming that “proper management of 
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the relationship is equally or more important than the basic contract management.”  In 
the context of IT Outsourcing Governance, the concepts of formal and informal methods 
of control have been segmented into three main areas or dimensions: Contractual 
Flexibility, Service Level Agreements (SLA’s), and the Complementary Nature of 
Contract and Relationship Management.  These are discussed below. 
Contractual Flexibility 
The logic behind Contractual Flexibility is fairly straightforward. Organizations must be 
able to adjust to unforeseen situations that can’t possibly have been included in the 
original contract; thus, organizations should strive to include flexibility clauses into the 
contract, or build a relationship that would enable adjustments to changing conditions 
(Goo et al., 2009; Lacity et al., 2009; Willcocks et al., 2007).  Moreover, purely contract-
driven control can be considered to be impractical because a contract cannot possibly 
include any and all eventualities that might occur during the term of a contract. Thus, 
adjustments to the contract will have to be made over the course of a project (Cong & 
Chau, 2007; Natovich, 2003).  
Contractual Flexibility can be achieved through the addition of clauses in the 
original contract during the negotiation process (Willcocks et al., 2007). In addition to 
flexibility clauses, the development of a partnership has been found to add flexibility to a 
working relationship (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). In order to structure a sourcing 
relationship, organizations must have contract and management tools in place to provide 
a clear point of contact and ensure effective communication between parties, and thus 
contributes to the governance of the IT outsourcing partnership (Beulen & Ribbers, 
2002).  
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To summarize, the contract should be designed to be flexible with the ability to 
change and grow as circumstances dictate. In this context, establishing a partnership will 
help resolve issues that might arise when changes need to be made to the original 
contract, which will increase the chances of success (Cong & Chau, 2007; Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks, 1994; Lacity et al., 2009). 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
The prevalent perspectives that underlie most research in inter-organizational relationship 
management focus on formal control and relational governance (Goo & Huang, 2008; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The formal control aspect of the relationship often takes the 
form of a formal contract with the addition of a Service Level Agreement (SLA). An 
SLA is a formal written agreement that is most often developed jointly by the client and 
vendor, and specifies products or services to be provided at a certain level in an 
outsourcing arrangement (Goo & Huang, 2008). Performance measurement is paramount 
for a successful outsourcing relationship, and in this context, SLAs play a key role in 
controlling for timeliness, accuracy, service availability, response to unforeseen 
emergencies and conflicts (Domberger et al., 2000; Gellings, 2007).  
SLAs are important because they provide the standards and controls that 
contribute to the strengthening of the relationship while providing the empirical data for 
measuring the success of the relationship (Alborz et al., 2003; McFarlan & Nolan, 1995). 
In order to better understand the nature of SLAs, Goo, Kishore, Rao and Nam (Goo et al., 
2009) carried out a study that identified three main characteristics of SLAs that are 
important for outsourcing arrangements. The characteristics can be summarized as 
follow: 
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• Foundation Characteristics: These characteristics set clear standards of conduct 
by defining what client and vendors are obligated to deliver and at what cost. 
They include provisions that specify the key principles and agreements between 
the parties, the key process owners and their roles and responsibilities, and the 
target levels of product and service performance.  
• Change Characteristics: Change characteristics determine how uncertainties can 
be handled throughout the relationship. They include provisions concerning 
processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes of future demand, processes for 
implementing foreseeable contingencies and changes, and efficient adjustments in 
the contract.  
• Governance Characteristics: These characteristics specify ways to maintain the 
relationship through a clear statement of the measurements, penalty and 
incentives, conflict arbitration, and methods and channels of communication. 
SLAs play an important role in the formal control aspect of the relationship, but are also 
often considered important to foster the informal aspect of the client vendor relationship. 
Trust and commitment in outsourcing relationships can be nurtured over time through 
joint development of SLAs as well as ongoing exchanges guided by the elements of 
SLAs (Goo & Huang, 2008). 
Complementary Nature of Contracts and Informal Relationship 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is often used to explain how client and vendors 
develop governance models in outsourcing arrangements (Goo et al., 2007; Goo et al., 
2009). TCE suggests that outsourcing parties will attempt to align governance features of 
the relationship to match known exchange hazards, such as asset investments, difficult 
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difficult performance measurement, or uncertainty. As exchange hazards increase, so 
must contractual safeguards, if contracting has been chosen as the governance mechanism 
(Williamson, 1985). However, explaining the relationship between organizations from a 
purely economic point of view is not advisable because inter-organizational relationships 
form out of the social learning experiences based on sequential social interactions 
between parties (Lee & Kim, 1999b; Szu-Yuan et al., 2002). Moreover, in the IT field in 
particular, an evolution in the nature of outsourcing from a purely client-vendor 
relationship to a partnership arrangement has been observed (Grover et al., 1996; 
Hirschheim et al., 2009). Consequently, it is important for clients and vendors to develop 
the organizational capacity to manage and foster the informal relationship between 
parties, because informal relationship management provides the means for developing 
common goals and objectives between the client and vendor. 
Although it is widely accepted that informal methods of control can play a role in 
outsourcing arrangements (Dibbern et al., 2004; Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Goo & 
Huang, 2008; Goo et al., 2007; Goo et al., 2009; Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 2003; 
Lee, 2001; Lee & Kim, 1999b, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Willcocks et al., 2007), 
there are different views regarding whether informal relationships act as substitutes or 
complements of formal methods of control. Proponents of the substitution view claim 
that informal relationships eliminate the need for formal contracts due to the growth in 
trust among parties as the relationship evolves (Gulati, 1995; Macaulay, 1963).  In 
addition, some may argue that contracts may actually hinder the development of a 
relationship since the elaboration of a detailed contract can be construed as lack of trust, 
and can encourage opportunistic behavior with respect to actions that cannot be specified 
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within a formal contract (Ghoshal & Morgan, 1996). More recently, Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) carried out a study to precisely address the substitute/complement argument. The 
results of the study show that the formal contract and informal relationships work as 
complements rather than substitutes. Poppo and Zenger suggest that “managers tend to 
employ greater levels of relational norms as their contracts become increasingly 
customized, and to employ greater contractual complexity as they develop greater levels 
of relational governance” (p. 721). Detailed contracts minimize risk and promote the 
longevity of the relationship by increasing the penalties associated with the severance of 
said relationship (Baker et al., 2002). Furthermore, the development of a detailed contract 
and the corresponding SLA requires both parties to work as a team in the negotiations in 
order to arrive to terms that are mutually beneficial. This social interaction serves as the 
foundation for the development of a relationship between parties, while the continuity of 
the relationship can lead to mutually agreed-upon refinements to the contract to reflect 
lessons learned during the project’s execution (Goo et al., 2009).  
Conflict Resolution 
Although Conflict Resolution is often mentioned as an important factor for outsourcing 
success and relationship management in the literature (Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Kern & 
Willcocks, 2002; Klepper, 1995; Kumar & van Dissel, 1996; Lacity & Willcocks, 2000; 
Lee & Kim, 1999b; Natovich, 2003), its importance is not reflected accordingly by level 
of treatment of this topic in our field. Even though Kern and Willcocks (2000) go as far 
as to claim that “A successful relationship is identifiable by the way it handles conflict 
situations,”  the dearth of research exclusively focused on conflict resolution in the IS 
literature only allows for a superficial analysis of this dimension, which is represented by 
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the following three overarching dimensions: Communication, Formal Control, and 
Negotiation Management (bargaining). The first two dimensions (Communication and 
Contractual Flexibility) have previously been discussed in the analysis of Partnership 
Quality and Formal Control and therefore, these dimensions will be briefly discussed in 
order to avoid redundancy. 
Contractual Flexibility 
Effective Formal Controls, in the form of a detailed contract and SLA, are considered 
important factors in minimizing conflicts (Lynch, 2000; Natovich, 2003). Natovich and 
Lynch advocate for flexible contracts that allow for adjustments to respond to changes in 
an evolving environment and to avoid contract driven management since it leads to the 
reduction of trust and commitment between parties.  
The treatment given to conflict resolution in the context of formal control is 
basically reduced to simply stating the advantages of formal and informal control, as 
previously discussed, without actually investigating what should be the best practices for 
conflict resolution in terms of formal procedures for escalation of conflicts, policies that 
could be enacted to reduce conflicts, and the effect of penalties and rewards in the 
prevention of conflicts.  
Communication 
Good communication can help parties achieve expectations, avoid conflicts, and facilitate 
solutions to problems (Kern & Willcocks, 2000). Frequent communication can help 
develop trust between client and vendor, which in turn can improve the formal and 
informal aspects of the relationship (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987). 
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According to Lynch (2000), open and frequent communication is key to avoid problems 
and unpleasant surprises in the relationship.  
Another aspect of Communication applied to conflict resolution is the proper 
alignment of expectations between client and vendors; the misalignment of expectations 
is often found to be root cause of problems in relationships (Kern & Willcocks, 2000; 
Vowler, 1996). The importance of the alignment of expectations between client and 
vendors was previously discussed during the analysis of Partnership Quality and the 
Psychological Contract between parties. The observed treatment of the role of 
communication in conflict resolution does not take into account factors such as proper 
training, communication tools, appropriate channels of communications for escalation of 
conflicts, etc.  
Negotiation Management 
Negotiation Management refers to the bargaining process that occurs during contract 
negotiations at the beginning of the relationship or when circumstances require 
adjustments in performance goals, or contractual terms (Klepper, 1995). According to 
Klepper, bargaining is critical to conflict resolution because it serves as a medium for 
relationship development, and foments trust and communication between parties 
(Klepper, 1995). Disagreements between client and vendor are a natural part of the 
outsourcing relationship. However, these disagreements can become dangerous when the 
engagement falls into a vicious cycle in which lack of trust leads to a conflict that yields 
poor performance, which in turn damages the trust even more and causes more conflicts 
(Natovich, 2003). In addition, the level of interdependence between organizations is 
likely to influence the potential and source for conflict. The higher the interdependence, 
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the higher the risk for conflict due to the inherent need for increased coordination that is 
required to support a highly interdependent relationship (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996; 
Robey & Sales, 1994). The coordination task can greatly be improved by the 
development of procedures for information sharing, a clear specification of roles, rights, 
and obligations, and an appropriate governance structure. The potential risk of conflict is 
reduced with greater structure (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).  
Another important aspect of the bargaining process that can help with conflict 
resolution is the achievement of a “fair deal” for all parties. In this context, a degree of 
cultural similarity can have a positive impact in developing a notion of a fair deal 
between client and vendor (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Henderson, 1990; Lasher et 
al., 1991). It is worth mentioning that although the concept of cultural similarity has great 
intuitive appeal and theoretical support, Lee and Kim found that its impact on partnership 
quality is negligible (Lee & Kim, 1999b).  This contradiction in results could be due to 
the operationalization of the constructs used by Lee and Kim, or as a direct consequence 
of the study design they used.  They did not track outsourcing relationships over time, 
which would make it very difficult to assess whether improvements in cultural 
similarities over time had a positive impact on conflict resolution and partnership quality. 
IT Outsourcing Governance Framework 
Based on the results of the argument map methodology, we can summarize the relevant 
dimensions surrounding the discourse on IT Outsourcing Governance with a framework 
that highlights the dual nature of Outsourcing Governance (formal/objective, and 
informal/subjective), along with the different dimensions that comprise this concept. 
Based on the discourse analysis, the different dimensions have been positioned within the 
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framework so as to reflect their formal or informal nature. The framework, along with a 
brief discussion of its components, is described below. 
• External Environment and Business Environment reflects the socio- and geo-
political conditions in which organizations exist and the market conditions under 
which they perform their activities. These factors are not studied in this work, but 
are included in the framework to show the awareness of their existence. 
• Governance Structure refers to the hierarchies that are used to delegate decision-
making rights within an outsourcing arrangement. Therefore, this dimension is 
predominantly managed through formal control.  
• Service Quality is inherently subjective. As depicted in the argument maps, this 
dimension focuses on trust building, mutual understanding, and fostering the 
development of the relationship into a partnership. 
• Relationship Management highly overlaps with Outsourcing Governance, and it 
spans across the formal/informal dimensions. This is to be expected based on the 
dual nature of outsourcing governance/relationship management.  Conflict 
Resolution and Partnership Quality have formal and informal components as 
well. Conflict Resolution deals with personality types, escalation procedures, 
penalties, communication quality, training, monitoring tools, etc. Partnership 
Quality focuses on Service Level Agreements (SLAs), communication channels, 
monitoring tools, and culture matching, to name a few. 
This framework summarizes the major areas that were identified during the literature 














Figure 6 - IT Outsourcing Governance Framework 
The main goal of the framework is to highlight the dual nature of IT Outsourcing 
Governance (ITOG) and how the major dimensions that relate to this concept fit within 
the formal/informal aspects of ITOG. A potential shortcoming of a framework developed 
from a literature review is that it might reflect a less-than-current understanding of IT 
Outsourcing Governance, since it can take several years for an academic article to be 
published. Thus, in order to capture the most current understanding of this topic, a social 
representations survey of practitioners and academics was performed. This survey 
provides another source of data that can be used to elucidate the key concepts comprising 
IT Outsourcing Governance.   
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Social Representations 
 The core/periphery analysis used in this study is based on the criteria described 
by Abric (2001) that posits that a core element can be determined on the basis of 
symbolic value, expressive value, and associative value, as described in Chapter 4. In this 
work, we are only concerned with the measurement of expressive and associative values.  
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results obtained for expressive and associative 
values along with the level of coreness of each topic. The level of coreness, and the 
classification of each topic into the core or periphery category, were obtained by 
performing a core periphery analysis which was developed by Borgatti and Everett 
(1999). This technique simultaneously takes into account expressive and associative 
values when determining the coreness of a topic, and was developed to detect a core and 
periphery structure in network data, which consists of values that represent strengths of 
relationships among items where coreness is considered a function of the closeness 
(either correlation or Euclidean distance) of an element to the center of the network.  
A software package for statistical analysis, developed by Borgatti and his 
colleagues, called UCINET was used in this work. UCINET includes routines to perform 
categorical and continuous core/periphery analysis. The difference between categorical 
and continuous core/periphery analysis is that the categorical analysis allocates topics in 
either core, or periphery, while the continuous analysis provides the level of coreness for 
each topic.  In this work, both techniques were employed to obtain the coreness values 
and the allocation of topics to the appropriate category. It is worth mentioning that 
although the saliency and the sum similarity of each topic plays and important role 
determining the coreness level, they are not the only factors considered in the calculation. 
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In order to confirm the results of the core/periphery analysis, a hierarchical cluster 
analysis was also performed on the same data set, with the results showing the same 
allocation of topics into two distinct categories (Core and Periphery).  As can be observed 
in the tables below, although there is considerable overlap between the conceptualizations 
of IT Outsourcing Governance among academics and practitioners, there are still 
significant differences in the results obtained that merit further exploration. These 
differences might indicate a disconnect between the academic knowledge and how IT 
practitioners actually work.  
Table 3 - Core and Periphery Membership - Academics 
Topics Salience (Frequency) 
Sum of 
Similarity Coreness Membership 
T2 Contract Management 11 1.069 0.473 
CORE 
T1 Relationship Management 11 1.155 0.470 
T6 Difficult to Implement 7 0.867 0.342 
T4 Performance Control 12 1.062 0.315 
T3 Conflict Resolution 2 0.534 0.219 
T8 Communication 2 0.767 0.208 
T11 Inter-organizational Structure 8 0.766 0.208 
T5 Organizational Capability 2 0.653 0.205 
T18 Service Quality 2 0.867 0.189 
T10 
Internal Organizational 
Structure 4 0.705 0.167 
T9 Psychological contract 4 0.843 0.155 
T19 Partnership Quality 2 0.677 0.153 
T13 Policies 4 0.868 0.152 
T12 Accountability 4 0.427 0.136 
T7 General Management 4 0.569 0.097 
T16 Important for Business 5 0.071 0.024 
PERIPHERY 
T14 Outsourcing Management 4 0.000 0.004 
T15 Academic Topic 2 0.000 0.003 
T17 
Human Resources 
Management 3 0.000 0.002 
T20 Security 0 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4 - Core and Periphery Membership - Practitioners 
Topics Salience (Frequency) 
Sum of 
Similarity Coreness Membership 
T18 Service Quality 8 1.545 0.534 
CORE 
T4 Performance Control 11 1.426 0.502 
T6 Difficult to Implement 9 1.161 0.335 
T1 Relationship Management 5 1.271 0.314 
T9 Psychological Contract 5 0.881 0.260 
T17 Human Resources Management 9 0.765 0.257 
T2 Contract Management 7 0.800 0.151 
PERIPHERY 
T8 Communication 1 0.644 0.145 
T16 Important for Business 7 0.476 0.144 
T12 Accountability 2 0.626 0.142 
T11 Inter-organizational Structure 2 0.702 0.120 
T3 Conflict Resolution 1 0.644 0.110 
T20 Security 3 0.367 0.085 
T7 General Management 2 0.000 0.001 
T13 Policies 2 0.000 0.001 
T19 Partnership Quality 1 0.000 0.001 
T5 Organizational Capability 1 0.000 0.000 
T10 Internal Organizational Structure 0 0.000 0.000 
T14 Outsourcing Management 0 0.000 0.000 
T15 Academic Topic 0 0.000 0.000 
 
In order to better understand the relationship among topics, a graphical 
representation of the network of topics was developed that shows their differences and 
similarities. By looking at the network and the position and connections of a particular 
topic, one can infer the different conceptualizations that academics and practitioners 
might have on a particular topic. The network diagrams for academics and practitioners 
are shown below. Each node in the diagram corresponds to a topic, with orphan nodes 
grouped on the upper left corner of the figures. These nodes are not connected to any 
other nodes in the network and as expected, were classified as peripheral topics during 
the core/periphery analysis. The connections between nodes depict the degree of 
similarity among topics, which is one of the determinants of coreness levels. The network 
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figures provide greater insight into the difference in conceptualizations of each topic, and 
thus the core/periphery structure of the social representation. For example, there are 
considerable differences in the connections and strengths of the links for “contract 
management” between both graphs. These differences seem to indicate, for instance, that 
practitioners consider Communication, Service Quality and Psychological Contract to be 
important concepts that relate to Contract Management, while academics seem to 
emphasize Accountability, Performance Control, and Difficulty of Implementation when 
referring to Contract Management. The same analysis could be performed for each topic 
of interest, to form what is called an “ego network.” The ego network allows for a closer 
inspection of the individual connections that each topic possesses. An analysis of the ego 










Figure 7 - Topic Network - Academics 
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Figure 8 - Topic Network - Practitioners 
The results of the social representations survey, coupled with the framework 
developed through Argument Mapping, provide a greater understanding of the relevant 
concepts for IT Outsourcing Governance. Another important aspect of outsourcing 
arrangements worth exploring is how they are managed, and in particular, which tools are 
used (described below), and how these tools’ feature sets fit with the relevant core 
concepts of IT Outsourcing Governance.  
Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) Tools Analysis 
One of the most interesting, yet shocking, results from the survey performed for the 
Cutter Consortium (complete results are included in Appendix D) was that very few 
organizations have adopted ORM tools to manage and evaluate contractual relationships. 
As it can be seen in Figure 9, only 7% of the 45 organizations surveyed used ORM tools 
to measure and evaluate performance of the contract after execution. 
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In order to better understand the results of the survey, an analysis of several ORM 
tools has been performed to compare the functionality that they provide. The tools 
included in this analysis are Janeeva, Enlighta Govern, EquaSiis, and Hisperos. These 
tools are a subset of the tools included in the IAOP report (IAOP, 2011) and were 
selected based on accessibility to data (demo, user accounts, etc.) and their specific focus 
on relationship management.   The results of the analysis of the ORM tools are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6. The categories used for comparison are Performance Management, SLA 
Management, Change Management, Conflict Resolution, and Project Management. These 
categories were selected because they represented the logical arrangement of 
functionality or modules for most of the tools analyzed. In addition, the contents of these 










Figure 9 - ORM Adoption among surveyed companies (Hirschheim et al., 2009) 
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Table 5 - Comparison of ORM Tools 
Module Janeeva Enlighta Govern EquaSiis Hiperos 
Performance 
Management 
- Automated web-based data 
collection 
- Personalized dashboards 
- Automatic scorecard generation 
- Easy-to-use self-serve report 
creation 
- Share reports and templates 
- Flexibility to easily add and 
change project, providers and 
metrics 
- Trending and predictive modeling 
- Alerts and notifications 
- Provider-to-Provider comparisons 
- Validate, approve, and analyze 
invoice data 
- Drill down to supporting data for 
problem diagnosis 
- Aggregate, validate and 
summarize data from diverse 
sources (excel, supplier feeds, 
ticketing systems, emails, etc.) 
- Executive dashboard that 
summarizes aggregated data 
- Near real-time insight into 
engagement performance 
- Ad hoc reporting and analytics 
- Multi-dimensional drill-down 
- Invoice validation and approval 
- Service pricing modeling 
- Automatic notifications 
- Financial reporting 
- Operational management and 
analytical tools 
- Business intelligence database 
- Invoice error verification and 
recovery                                                  
- Financial Modeling 
- Data collection and aggregation 
- Customizable reports 
- Alerts and notifications 
- Provider comparison based on 
customizable impact categories 
SLA 
Management 
- Record SLAs and store contract 
terms for multiple towers, 
agreements, and projects 
- Automatically capture and 
calculate SLA metrics 
- Define multiple targets for each 
SLA 
- Define and manage performance-
based pricing models 
- Log changes to definitions, 
metrics, and incentive structures 
- Track events and generate 
reminders of key contractual 
obligations 
- Automatically generate service 
level default notifications 
- Drill down to supporting data for 
problem diagnosis 
- SLA Monitoring and reporting 
- Contract change management 
- Compliance scorecards and 
monitoring 
- Executive dashboards for 
actionable insight 
- Automatic notifications 
- Contract monitoring 
- Compliance scorecard 
- Holistic view to facilitate action 
- Contract and provider monitoring 
- Compliance scorecard 
- Automated scoring logic of 





Table 5 - Comparison of ORM Tools (Continued)  
Module Janeeva Enlighta Govern EquaSiis Hiperos 
Change 
Management 
- Manage scope changes and new 
service requests 
- Manage additional resource charges 
(ARC), scope changes, and new 
service requests 
- Built-in best practices 
- Automatic approval tracking and 
routing 
- Automatic notifications 
- Flexible form and process 
definition 
- Easily searchable record of 
agreements 
- Secure, auditable history 
- Tracking and reporting of change 
requests for application and 
infrastructure changes 
- Automation of multi-level 
approval process                                         
- Automatic notifications 
- Transition management 
- Automation and workflow 
management 
- Operational management 
- Tracking and reporting of change 
requests 
- Automation and workflow 
management                                         
- Automatic notifications 
Conflict 
Resolution 
- Assign client and provider issue 
owners 
- Easily track resolution activities 
- Assign and track specific action 
plans 
- Structured meeting planning and 
follow-up processes 
- Built-in best practices 
- Clear escalation process 
- Easily searchable knowledge base 
of solutions 
- Secure, auditable history 
- Issue management and escalation 
- Automated alerts to stakeholders - Issue Management 
- There is no dedicated control for 
conflict resolution.  
Project 
Management 
- Corporate-wide view of all 
outsourced processes and providers 
- Tracking of provider capacity, key 
performance and financial metrics, 
buyer satisfaction, and reliability 
- Easy provider and project 
comparisons 
- Drill-down to detailed performance 
data 
- Communication forum that allows 
providers to share news and 
innovations 
- Repository for provider agreements 
and audits results 
- Work order automation 
- Snapshot view of the actual 
versus total approved spend for 
work orders by owner, by supplier, 
by region and by business unit 
- Service request automation 
- Automated assignment, 
estimation, approval, escalation, 
delivery, acceptance and feedback. 
- Tracking and reporting of 
milestones, deliverables, issue 
escalations, risks, schedule, budget, 
quality and volume metrics by 
request category and supplier 
- Knowledge management 
- Resource allocation 
- Seamless interface with 
Microsoft Office, Outlook, 
SharePoint, Biztalk, and SQL 
- Snapshot of all outsourced 
processes and providers 
- Tracking of provider capacity, key 
performance and financial metrics 
- Easy provider and project 
comparisons 
- Drill-down to detailed performance 
data 
- Communication forum that allows 
providers to share information 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION  
 
In this section, the results obtained from the argument mapping methodology, social 
representations survey, and ORM Tools analysis are further explored in order to 
understand their meaning and plausible causes or factors that might have contributed to 
the observed outcomes.  
Argument Mapping 
Perhaps the most salient outcome from the argument mapping processes is that IT 
Outsourcing Governance seems to have a dual nature with a formal dimension related to 
the governance structure, and an informal dimension that covers relationship 
management. This apparent duality is discussed below. 
Outsourcing Governance or Relationship Management? 
During the argument mapping process, it was observed that the terms “outsourcing 
governance” and “relationship management” were used interchangeably. A potential 
explanation for this apparent confusion may be that academics, by and large, do not have 
a clear understanding of the difference between the concepts of governance and 
relationship management. Although it is certainly plausible that some academics could 
confuse both terms, this phenomenon is only observed when dealing with IT Outsourcing 
Governance. In the IT Governance literature the difference between governance and 
relationship management is clear and beyond dispute. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the cause of the interchangeable use of these terms when talking about IT 
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Outsourcing Governance might be related to the nature of this concept, and not an 
inherent misunderstanding of the topic. 
 It is worth mentioning that IT Outsourcing Governance is different from its close 
relative “IT Governance.” Unlike IT Governance, IT Outsourcing Governance cannot 
exist if there is no relationship between client and vendor, and at the same time, a 
relationship between client and vendor cannot prosper without establishing decision 
rights and accountability. This apparent circular dependence between IT Outsourcing 
Governance and relationship management is an example of what Giddens terms the 
“duality of structure.”  
In his Theory of Structuration, Giddens claims that it is improper to conceive of a 
social system merely as the product of either deliberate human action or institutional 
forces. The duality of structure refers to the notion that the structure or institutional 
properties of social systems are created by human action and then serve to shape future 
human action. As Roberts and Scapens (1985) note: “Through being drawn on by people, 
structures shape and pattern interaction. However only through interaction are 
structures themselves reproduced.” 
Consequently, if structuration is used to better understand the relationship 
between governance and relationship management, the underlying duality of IT 
Outsourcing Governance arises as it can be conceived of as both the product of 
relationship management and the very medium by which the relationship exists. In other 
words, using the terminology described by Orlikowski and Robey (1991) this duality is 
expressed in its constituted nature; IT Outsourcing Governance is the social product of 
subjective human interaction within specific structural and cultural contexts - and its 
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constitutive role - IT Outsourcing Governance is simultaneously an objective set of rules 
and resources involved in mediating (facilitating and constraining) human action, and 
hence contributing to the creation, recreation, and transformation of these contexts. Thus, 
IT Outsourcing Governance is both an antecedent and a consequence of relationship 
management. 
Looking at IT Outsourcing Governance from a structuration standpoint focuses 
attention on the social factors related to the development, evolution and implementation 
of IT Outsourcing Governance among clients and vendors. 
In the traditional conceptualization of IT Governance, exemplified in the popular 
work of Weill and Ross (2008), the locus of attention is to align different governance 
structures with the intended goals of an organizations. The constitution of the governance 
structure however, is taken for granted since organizations can unilaterally decide what 
governance structure to adopt. Since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social 
process where relationship management, and therefore social interaction, takes a more 
prominent role, the locus of study should shift towards the understanding of how 
relationship management, social interaction and organizational context help shape, and 
are affected by, the governance structure agreed upon among parties of the sourcing 
arrangement. In this context, the following factors appear to gain importance when 
looking at IT Outsourcing Governance through structuration theory. 
• Governance structure constitution: The most popular perspectives into 
governance structures are derived from the work of Sambamurthy and Zmud 
(Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, 2000; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Webb et al., 
2006) and Weill and Ross (2008) where the governance structure can take 
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different forms based on who holds the decision rights. These views however, 
seem to neglect the relationship management aspect of governance in an 
outsourcing relationship. More recently, Schwarz and Hirschheim (2003)used an 
extended platform logic model to study IT Governance that embraces a 
relationship-based view of governance. In this context, the structuration approach 
to IT Outsourcing Governance not only provides further support to Schwarz and 
Hirschheim’s views, but also locates relationship management at the center of the 
discussion. By focusing on the social aspect of ITOG, academics will increase the 
understanding of how governance structures arise and how they impact the 
underlying working structures within the client and vendor organizations. 
• Influence of human interaction: As previously stated, the interaction among 
subjects has not been considered a major factor for traditional governance 
research. Since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social concept, 
structuration theory brings focus to the conditions within which human interaction 
reinforces, or changes the governance structure of the relationship. 
• Organizational context: This factor describes the organizational contexts in which 
relationships between client and vendors are fostered in order to shape ITOG. 
The above-referenced topics could be further scrutinized with additional research focused 
on the impact that relationship management has on the governance structure of the 
sourcing arrangement.  
Defining IT Outsourcing Governance 
Based on the IT Outsourcing Governance framework developed by the argument 
mapping analysis, coupled with the relevant topics identified by the core/periphery 
! 99!
methodology and the theoretical foundation provided by Giddens’ structuration theory, a 
new definition for IT Outsourcing Governance is proposed in order to reflect its dual 
nature in a succinct way. Thus, one could define IT Outsourcing Governance as the 
process of defining decision rights within an accountability framework that is 
continuously shaped by social interaction. It determines the rules, processes, 
performance metrics, roles and organizational structures needed for effective 
management of the client-vendor relationship. It is worth highlighting that IT 
Outsourcing Governance is conceptualized as both a process and an outcome with 
relationship management playing a key role.  
 Emphasizing the social aspect of the relationship between client and vendor to 
study the governance structure of a sourcing arrangement would represent a shift in the 
focus of the research on this topic.  
Social Representations of IT Outsourcing Governance 
The social representations survey that was administered to academics and practitioners, 
along with the core/periphery analysis, showed that both groups have different 
conceptualizations of IT Outsourcing Governance. Although the conceptualizations from 
the respective groups contain some overlap, there are significant differences that warrant 
further exploration. The table below summarizes the core/periphery results obtained, 
sorted by level of coreness (from most core to least). The concepts in bold, underlined 
font, indicate key differences in the conceptualizations of IT Outsourcing Governance 




Table 6 - Differences in Conceptualization of ITGO Between Academics and 
Practitioners 
Analysis of Academic Responses Analysis of Industry Responses 
Core Concepts Core Concepts 
T2 Contract Management   0.473 T18 Service Quality   0.534 
T1 Relationship Management   0.470 T4 Performance Control   0.502 
T6 Difficult to Implement   0.342 T6 Difficult to Implement   0.335 
T4 Performance Control   0.315 T1 Relationship Management   0.314 
T3 Conflict Resolution   0.219 T9 Psychological contract   0.260 
T8 Communication   0.208 T17 Human Resources Management   0.257 
T11 Inter-organizational Structure   0.208   
T5 Organizational Capability   0.205 Peripheral Concepts 
T18 Service Quality   0.189 T2 Contract Management   0.151 
T10 Internal Organizational Structure   0.167 T8 Communication   0.145 
T9 Psychological contract   0.155 T16 Important for business   0.144 
T19 Partnership Quality   0.153 T12 Accountability   0.143 
T13 Policies   0.152 T11 Inter-organizational Structure   0.120 
T12 Accountability   0.136 T3 Conflict Resolution   0.110 
T7 General Management   0.097 T20 Security   0.085 
  T19 Partnership Quality   0.001 
Peripheral Concepts T13 Policies   0.001 
T16 Important for business   0.024 T7 General Management   0.001 
T14 Outsourcing Management   0.004 T5 Organizational Capability   0.000 
T15 Academic Topic   0.003 T14 Outsourcing Management   0.000 
T17 Human Resources Management   0.002 T15 Academic Topic   0.000 
T20 Security   0.000 T10 Internal Organizational Structure   0.000 
 
Contract Management 
The different levels of importance conveyed to contract management by academics and 
practitioners is perhaps the most surprising finding of this study. As one would expect, 
academics consider contract management a core concept when discussing IT Outsourcing 
Governance. Practitioners, on the other hand, consider contract management a peripheral 
concept. A possible explanation for this difference can be found by looking at the results 
of the Cutter survey discussed in Chapter 4. As shown in Figures 10 and 11, IT 
practitioners indicated that contract negotiation and management are largely handled by 
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the procurement department or high level executives that are unlikely to participate in the 
day to day management of the relationship. This could explain why practitioners that are 
actually in charge of managing the client-vendor relationship do not consider it to be a 











Figure 10 - Summary of results regarding contract management 










Figure 11 - Summary of results regarding contract management  
(Hirschheim et al., 2009) 
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These results seem to indicate that contract management may not be as important 
to practitioners directly involved in the management of the client-vendor relationship as 
academics think. This by no means implies that contract management is not an important 
contributor to the success of a sourcing arrangement, but it could shift the focus of study 
from contract characteristics (such as length, level of detail, etc.) to understanding who is 
participating in the contract management process and how that participation correlates 
with the success level of the sourcing arrangement.  
Human Resources 
One would expect that human resources are an important concern for practitioners when 
managing outsourcing arrangements. It is surprising that academics almost completely 
ignored the topic when responding to the survey. A potential explanation for this 
difference could be that human resources are typically studied within management 
disciplines, rather than in IS, and research in that area could be considered peripheral to 
our discipline. Given the fact that practitioners consider human resources a core concept, 
and since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social process, human resources 
should take a heightened role in academic research of IT Outsourcing Governance. 
Communication 
Common sense dictates that communication should be an important factor when carrying 
out an outsourcing arrangement. However, practitioners consider communication a 
peripheral concept of IT Outsourcing Governance, while academic consider 
communication to be a core factor. Once again, the results of the Cutter survey can be 
used to try to understand the reasoning behind this classification. Figures 12 and 13 
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below summarize the responses of practitioners when queried about the importance of 












Figure 12 - Summary of results regarding the importance of communication in the 
client-vendor relationship (Hirschheim et al., 2009) 
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Figure 13 - Summary of results regarding the importance of communication in the 




As the figures show, although practitioners consider communication to be a key factor for 
the success of a sourcing arrangement, only 40% of surveyed companies actually trained 
their employees to improve their communication skills. One could infer that practitioners 
are possibly taking communication skills for granted, rather than assigning it the level of 
importance that it should have. In this context, academics should strive to make their 
research regarding the benefits of effective communication more accessible to 
practitioners since communication is paramount for relationship management, and thus 
for IT Outsourcing Governance.  
Conflict Resolution 
This is another area in which there is a significant difference between academic and 
practitioner perspectives. One would expect that conflict resolution would be of particular 
importance in practice, although the results seem to contradict that assumption. Looking 
at the results from the Cutter survey once more could provide some illumination. Figure 
14 summarizes the results obtained regarding conflict resolution. 
As the results show, the majority of surveyed participants do not provide formal 
training to improve conflict resolution skills. Similar to the case with communication, 
conflict resolution skills might be another area that practitioners assume are unnecessary 
to develop in employees. The difference in the perceived importance of conflict 
resolution is an important finding that could indicate a disconnect between academic 
research and practice.  The disconnect could be caused by a dearth of research in this 
area, coupled with practitioners not having access to articles that highlight the importance 
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Figure 14 - Summary of results - Conflict Resolution 
 (Hirschheim et al., 2009) 
 
Argument Mapping vs. Social Representations 
The results of the argument mapping methodology and the social representations 
surveyed proved to be fairly consistent. Argument mapping is a valuable tool for 
discourse analysis that facilitated the identification of relevant topics or dimensions. 
However, one cannot infer importance of a concept through argument mapping. In this 
context, the use of the core/periphery analysis filled that void by eliciting the degree of 
coreness of each concept. Although there is not a perfect match between the results of 
both methodologies, the high level of consistency between them is significant. 
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Taken together, the results gleaned from each technique provide a much richer 
insight into the nature of IT Outsourcing Governance. Argument mapping provides a 
summary of the discourse surrounding IT Outsourcing Governance in the academic 
literature, while core/periphery analysis not only provides validation to the argument 
mapping results, but also enhances those results by adding levels of importance or 
coreness to each concept.  Consequently, academics can use these results to help guide 
the development of new research strategies that would focus on the understanding of the 
elicited core/periphery structure for IT Outsourcing Governance. 
ORM Tools and IT Outsourcing Governance 
Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) tools offer monitoring capabilities and 
analytics tools that organizations utilize to measure the performance of the outsourcing 
arrangement and manage the client-vendor relationship. However, as shown in Chapter 5, 
the adoption of these tools remains surprisingly low.  
The ORM tools analyzed in the work (Janeeva, Enlighta, EquaSiis, and Hiperos) 
proved to be extremely sophisticated and powerful tools. Reviewing the list of features 
and capabilities of the respective tools, one finds that they cover most of the topics that 
were found to be relevant for IT Outsourcing Governance that were identified through 
argument mapping and social representations.  Since the features offered by the ORM 
tools seem to match the dimensions found to be relevant for IT Outsourcing Governance, 
it is worth discussing possible explanations as to why their adoption in industry is so low 
(Hirschheim et al., 2009).  
As one would expect, the features of the tools are developed around functions that 
can be easily quantified and automated. Thus, most of the functionality found revolves 
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around contract management, compliance, and progress reports. This level of 
functionality, coupled with the fact that the procurement department plays a major role in 
the management of these functions, could provide some insights into the low level of 
adoption of ORM tools. There seems to be a disconnect or mismatch between the target 
audience for these tools (personnel in charge of the day-to-day management of a sourcing 
arrangement) and the functionality provided. One could make the argument that ORM 
tools are better suited to support of the procurement department operations, and not the 
needs of an IT manager.  
Although all the tools analyzed had some functionality aimed at improving 
communication between client and vendor, relationship management is a highly 
subjective, informal process that cannot be packaged into a software module. Thus, IT 
managers whose jobs are focused on the management of the relationship between client 
and vendors might see little value in using one of these tools to perform their jobs. If, on 
the other hand, an IT manager has a larger role in contract negotiation and management, 
and handling conflict resolution, these tools could offer added value since they provide a 
snapshot view of the sourcing arrangement.  
Theoretical/Philosophical Foundation to Justify the Development of 
Partnerships in Outsourcing Arrangements 
!
As shown in the literature review, there appears to be a consensus that developing 
partnerships when entering an outsourcing arrangement is the strategy that promotes the 
most ideal conditions for a successful client-vendor relationship. However, these findings 
have been largely based on empirical findings with little theoretical support.  
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One theoretical lens that could explain why partnerships are the most successful 
type of relationship is Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984b). 
When we apply Habermas’ theory to IT Outsourcing Governance we find that an 
outsourcing arrangement that is not established as a partnership is built on the foundation 
of strategic action, where ego, self-interest, and hidden agendas are the drivers of the 
communication between client and vendor. As such, client and vendor will soon find 
themselves “misaligned” regarding goals, expectations, culture, et cetera. On the other 
hand, an outsourcing arrangement that is established as a partnership is developed upon 
communicative action, where the goal is the achievement of understanding where “to 
reach understanding means that the partners in interaction set out, and manage to 
convince, each other, so that their action is coordinated on the basis of motivation 
through reason” (Brand, 1990).   
The coordination mechanism of communicative action differs from that of 
strategic action in that the latter is based on egocentric calculations and is coordinated on 
the basis of a communion of interests (as is exampled in market economies), whereas the 
former is based on the pure force of the better argument. Not that communicative action 
nullifies individualistic motivations, but in communicative action, these ends are 
subjugated to the use of language in a manner that is oriented towards achieving 
understanding.  The essential difference is that in strategic action, ego influences the 
choice/decision not through criticizable claims couched in language but by sanctions, or 
gratifications, force, or money.   
Therefore, by moving from strategic action to communicative action, the 
emphasis of the relationship moves from one of pure financial consideration to the 
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achievement of common understanding, all while supporting individualistic motivations. 
This change in focus helps us understand why outsourcing arrangements that have 
developed into partnerships have been found to be more successful than those that have 
not developed into partnerships. Consequently, it may be worth exploring which 
organizational contexts and communication techniques promote the development of 














CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of IT Outsourcing 
Governance, which has become an increasingly significant topic in recent years (Dibbern 
et al., 2004). To better understand this phenomenon, a comprehensive framework for IT 
Outsourcing Governance was created and then used to analyze how academics and 
practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance through the use of core/periphery 
analysis. In addition, a review of existing technology (ORM tools) developed specifically 
to manage outsourcing arrangements has been performed in order to better understand the 
alignment between technology and management practices.  
An extensive literature review was performed and analyzed with argument 
mapping in order to create the comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing 
Governance. Argument mapping proved to be a very useful discourse analysis tool that 
was perfectly suited for the objective of this work. As the results showed, the process of 
argument mapping helped elicit the different factors that academics considered relevant 
when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. One of the most striking outcomes of the 
argument mapping process was the uncovering of the dual nature of IT Outsourcing 
Governance, which is composed of a formal dimension dealing with governance 
structures and control, and an informal dimension that deals predominantly with 
relationship management. The observed duality of IT Outsourcing Governance is a key 
finding of this work because it provides a better understanding of the concept and 
presents a sharp contrast to the traditional view of IT Governance. Consequently, a new 
definition of IT Outsourcing Governance has been proposed in order to reflect the dual 
nature that was uncovered by the IT Outsourcing Governance framework. The new 
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definition proposes that IT Outsourcing Governance is the process of defining decision 
rights within an accountability framework that is continuously shaped by social 
interaction. It determines the rules, processes, performance metrics, roles and 
organizational structures needed for effective management of the client-vendor 
relationship. This conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance represents a shift in 
the focus of IT Outsourcing Governance and a departure from the traditional governance 
approach championed by Weill and Ross (2008), which is based on a structure-goal 
alignment perspective, to a relationship-centric perspective that focuses attention on the 
social aspect of governance and how human interaction and organizational contexts 
influence relationship management and governance structures.  
In addition to the argument maps, a social representations survey was performed 
in order to elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance 
between academics and practitioners. The results of the survey were used to perform a 
core/periphery analysis in order to determine core and peripheral concepts used by 
academics and practitioners when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. The core 
topics identified by the analysis show a high degree of overlap with the framework that 
was developed from the findings resulting from the argument mapping technique. In 
addition, several differences in conceptualization were observed between academics and 
practitioners that could give rise to new research opportunities. In particular, the 
differences observed with respect to contract management, and the role of IT 
practitioners in their crafting, negotiation, and management, is worth further exploration.  
The widespread adoption of outsourcing as a common management practice has 
created, as a byproduct, a new market of tools designed to aid organizations in the 
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management of outsourcing arrangements. These tools, collectively categorized as 
“Outsourcing Relationship Tools,” have been analyzed in this work in order to better 
understand their capabilities. The results of the analysis show that ORM tools have been 
designed to mainly address the formal dimension of IT Outsourcing Governance, as they 
focus on the development of status reports, compliance, automated notifications, etc., 
rather than on the informal aspects of relationship management, such as informal 
communication and informal resolution of conflicts. According to the results obtained 
from the Cutter survey, a previous study that explored the intricacies of the client-vendor 
relationship, (Hirschheim et al., 2009) these tools seem better suited to manage the 
functions performed by the procurement department, than to support the day-to-day 
management of the client-vendor relationship.  
Implications for Research 
This work has several implications for research that have been briefly discussed in 
previous chapters. 
 First, argument mapping has been demonstrated as a useful tool to elicit relevant 
dimensions of a concept through the analysis of existing literature. Argument mapping is 
a discourse analysis tool that researchers should consider adding to their set of tools for 
discourse analysis.  
Second, the results from the core/periphery analysis highlighted significant 
differences in conceptualization between academics and practitioners. These differences 
are worth exploring with further research into the topics of contract management, 
communication, and conflict resolution. The difference in conceptualization surrounding 
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the importance of contract management is one of the most relevant results of this work 
and could create a new stream of research focused on exploring the role that IT managers 
and other personnel involved in the day-to-day management of the client-vendor 
relationship have during contract negotiation, management, execution and evaluation.  
Third, a new definition for IT Outsourcing Governance has been provided based 
on the results of the argument mapping analysis. This new definition, based on Giddens’ 
structuration theory, proposes a new perspective to understand IT Outsourcing 
Governance, with relationship management at its core. In this context, academics might 
embark upon new streams of research focused on how human interaction and 
organizational contexts help shape the governance structure of an outsourcing 
arrangement. For example, academics could better study the dynamics between the IT 
and the procurement departments of an organization during the negotiation and 
management of a sourcing arrangement. The findings of this work seem to indicate that 
in actuality, the procurement department dominates contract negotiation, execution and 
evaluation with limited participation from the IT department.  
Fourth, a new theoretical lens has been provided to better understand the 
evolution of a relationship into a partnership. This new lens is Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action. Using this lens, the conditions for the creation of a partnership are 
met when the parties achieve communicative actions as opposed to strategic action, 
which dominates most commercial transactions. Thus, academics may wish to study 
which social interactions, cultural factors, and organizational contexts promote 
communicative action, which in turn will lead to development of a partnership. For 
instance, academics could study the impact of communication training, and partnership-
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building activities, such as inter-organizational cross-training of employees, in companies 
engaged in sourcing arrangements.  
Finally, academics might investigate factors surrounding the adoption of the 
ORM tools used to manage outsourcing relationships. The results of this work indicate 
that there might be a lack of alignment between the features offered by ORM tools and 
the functions performed by IT managers. In this context, further studies are necessary to 
better understand the reasons underlying the observation that the adoption of ORM tools 
is low among practitioners.  
Implications for Practice 
The results of this study may be highly relevant to practitioners involved in outsourcing 
arrangements. The implications for practice can thus be summarized as follows.  
First, practitioners may want to review the role of the procurement department. As 
the results show, the procurement department may be impeding effective management of 
the client-vendor relationship by taking responsibilities that are better suited to IT 
managers. 
Second, managers in charge of the client-vendor relationship should emphasize 
skill development for relationship management, particularly since it is at the core of IT 
Outsourcing Governance. In particular, practitioners should emphasize communication 
and conflict resolution skills that are often taken for granted or assumed to exist. 
Finally, the utilization of ORM tools may be beneficial for managers that actively 
participate in contract management, conflict resolution, and performance evaluation.  
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Limitations of the Study 
The limitations to this study are placed in the following categories: 
• Scope 
o The different dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance were elicited from the 
academic and practitioner literature using an approach other than the traditional 
method of administering surveys to key stakeholders and performing a factor 
analysis to elicit relevant dimension of the latent construct. Although the 
conceptualizations of practitioners and academics were captured in the 
core/periphery analysis and were used to “validate” the framework, this limited 
participation of key stakeholders could be seen as a limitation since the social 
representation technique used to elicit core and peripheral concepts produces 
extremely short responses that require the interpretation of the responses from 
the researchers. 
o The analysis of ORM tools is limited to the consideration of how their 
respective features cover the different dimensions of IT Outsourcing 
Governance. Other possible reasons that could hinder the adoption of ORM 
tools, such as price, ease of use, compatibility with existing systems, etc. were 
not included in this study. Additionally, only a subset of ORM tools was 
analyzed, rather than all available ORM tools in the market. 
• Generalizability 
o The study takes a novel approach to identifying the different dimensions of IT 
Outsourcing Governance. This predominantly interpretivist approach, based on 
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argument mapping, and validated by core/periphery analysis, may not be well 
received by an audience with a more positivistic viewpoint.  
o The survey performed for the social representations analysis only included 31 
academics (considered experts in their field), and 29 practitioners that are 
actively working on outsourcing arrangements. This sample may not be 
representative of the whole population, and thus, the results might not 
generalize in the positivistic sense.  
Concluding Thoughts 
As the use outsourcing continues to grow and evolve, there is a clear and increasing need 
to better understand how to effectively govern the increasingly complex set of vendors, 
clients, users, etc., who are involved in and affected by an outsourcing arrangement. 
Hopefully, this study has articulated why IT Outsourcing Governance is an important 
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APPENDIX A – SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS SURVEY 
 
Survey Instrument 
























Figure 16 - Survey Instrument - Part 2 
 
Summary of Results 
A summary of the responses to the survey is given in the tables below. The summary 
includes type of job, years of experience, role performed in the outsourcing arrangement, 
types of services used/provided, or research areas in the case of academics.  
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1! Academic! ! !
!
31! 52%!
2! IT!Professional! ! ! ! 15! 25%!
3! Other! ! !
!
14! 23%!
! Total! ! 60! 100%!
 




1! Client! ! !
!
18! 30%!
2! Vendor! ! !
!
7! 12%!
3! Researcher! ! !
!
30! 50%!
4! Other! ! !
!
5! 8%!
! Total! ! 60! 100%!
 




1! Application/software!development! ! !! 46! 77%!
2! Web!development/hosting! ! !
!
29! 48%!
3! Application!support!or!management! ! !! 31! 52%!
4! Technical!support/help!desk! ! ! ! 21! 35%!
5! Database!development/management! ! ! ! 26! 43%!
6! Telecommunications! ! !
!
22! 37%!
7! Infrastructure! ! !
!
27! 45%!

















3! More!than!10!years! ! ! ! 26! 43%!



















T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 Total
T1 1.000 0.333 0.167 0.118 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.167 0.077 0.083 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.155
T2 0.333 1.000 0.167 0.118 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.069
T3 0.167 0.167 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.534
T4 0.118 0.118 0.000 1.000 0.167 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.167 0.077 0.000 1.062
T5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 1.000 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.653
T6 0.133 0.214 0.000 0.143 0.286 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.867
T7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.569
T8 0.167 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.767
T9 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 1.000 0.111 0.100 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.843
T10 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.111 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705
T11 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.091 0.111 0.000 0.100 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.766
T12 0.077 0.083 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.427
T13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.222 0.111 0.143 0.200 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.868
T14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071
T17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.000 0.867
T19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.677
T20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
 APPENDIX B – IAS MATRICES  
!
The IAS matrices used for the core/periphery analysis are shown in the tables below.!
 


























APPENDIX C – IRB APPROVAL  
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Figure 17 - IRB Exemption Form 
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APPENDIX D – CUTTER SURVEY  
 
The results of the survey performed in partnership with the Cutter Consortium, along 

















Figure 18 - Cutter Survey - Part 1 
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Figure 20 - Cutter Survey - Part 3 
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Well structured SLAs 
play an important role 
in cultivating favorable 
relationships. (Goo & 
Huang, 2008)
Firms strategically use 
SLA to successfully 
manage IT Outsourcing 
Relationships(Goo & 
Huang, 2008; Gellings, 
2007)
A sound governance of 
the outsourcing 
relationship is vital to its 
success (Gewald, 2006; 
Alborz et al, 2003; Kern 
and Willcocks, 2001)
As the service provider 
takes on several 
responsibilities, the role of 
the retained IT department 
will fundamentally change 
(Gewald, 2006)
Managing end-user and 
service provider relationships 
are new disciplines which 
have to be developed
(Gewald, 2006, Alborz et al., 
2004)
Successful IT outsourcing 
relies heavily on a 
psychological contract 
between the customer and 
the supplier. (Koh et. al., 
2004)
Customers perceive supplier obligations to 
be accurate project scoping, clear authority 
structures, taking charge, effective human 
capital management, effective knowledge 
transfer, and effective interorganizational 
teams. (Koh et. al., 2004)
Suppliers perceive customer obligations as 
clear specifications, prompt payment, close 
project monitoring, dedicated project staffing, 
knowledge sharing, and project ownership. 
(Koh et. al., 2004)
Results show that fulfilled 
obligations predict success 
over and above the effects 
of contract type, duration, 
and size. (Koh et. al., 2004)
Service quality and the 
establishment of 




(Grover et. al. 1996)
The elements of partnership: 
trust, communication, 
satisfaction, and cooperation, are 
related to the perceived 
achievement of benefits.   
(Grover et. al. 1996;  (Lee & Kim,  
1999))
Trust, norms, open 
communication, open 
sharing of information, 
mutual dependency, and 
cooperation are always 
associated with higher 
levels of IT Outsourcing 
success. (Lacity,  2009)
Partnership quality may 
serve as a key predictor 
of outsourcing success. 
(Lee & Kim,  1999)
The involvement of senior 
managers, and rigorous evaluation 
processes were associated with 
higher levels of IT Outsourcing 
success (Lacity,  2009; Kern and 
Willcocks, 2002; Zviran et al., 
2001)
More contract detail, shorter-term 
contracts, and higher-dollar valued 
contracts were positively related to 
ITO success. (Lacity,  2009)
Service and/or product 
delivery and its monitoring 
was found to be the 
fundamental driver of the 
relationship for client 
companies.  (Kern, 2000)
As these exchanges became 
institutionalised the relationship 
began to gain in status and benefits 
became visible  (Kern, 2000)
All companies agreed the 
importance of continuously 
monitoring the satisfaction of those 
receiving IT services (Schwarz & 
Hirschheim, 2003)
A successful relationship is 
identifiable by the way it 
handles conflict situations.  
(Kern, 2000)
In those circumstances when 
problems arose, both sides needed 
to prove their willingness to 
cooperate.  (Kern, 2000)
Finding a solution without 
falling-out or having to refer 
to the contract was found as 
a sign of understanding and 
cultural synergy.  (Kern, 
2000)
The key to a successful 
outsourcing project is a clear 
definition of the project scope, 
appropriate management tools, 
close monitoring of the projects' 
progress and top management 
involvenment.  
Well-developed SLAs not only 
provide a way to measure the service 
provider’s performance, but also 
enable effective management of 
outsourcing engagements through the 
development of partnership-style 
relation- ships with high levels of trust 
and commitment. (Goo et al., 2009)
Contracts and relational 
governance function as 
complements rather than as 
substitutes. (Goo et al., 2009; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002)
Investing appropriately 
in governance is 
perhaps the best way to 
protect a company’s far 
greater investments in 
outsourcing. (Shahani, 
2007)
The more relationships you 
have, the more important 
relationship management 
becomes. (Shahani, 2007)
There is a  direct correlation 
between the investment that 
organizations make in 
outsourcing management and 
their satisfaction with their 
outsourcing engagement. 
(Shahani, 2007)
To improve user satisfaction, clients found that 
vendors need to have a greater understanding of 
their business and to show more commitment, 
and should possibly initiate investments beyond 
the terms stipulated in the agreement to ensure 
that the working relationship is maintained. (Kern 
& Blois, 2002)
Only through high satisfaction 
levels can confidence in the 
vendor be built, which 
ultimately leads to trust. (Kern 
& Blois, 2002)
Classical and neoclassical 
contract theory suffers from a 
rigidness that does not take 
into account the relational 
aspect in contracts.(Kern,
1997)
Lack of management oversight 
will cause problems. (Bendor-
Samuel, 2002; Zviran et al., 
2001)
Buyers frequently underestimate the 
time and attention required to manage 
an outsourcing relationship (Bendor-
Samuel, 2002)
the supplier will begin to 
operate in a priority vacuum, 
and service levels will 
deteriorate because the 
supplier's agenda will not be in 
sync with the buyer's business 
objectives. (Bendor-Samuel, 
2002)
You can’t put everything in a 
contract, you can’t tie 
everything down. (Fitzgerald 
& Willcocks,1994)
The relationship needs to be 
flexible, and have the ability to 
change and grow (Cong, et al. 




fundamental to the 
governance of the 
outsourcing 
relationship
70% of the client managers’ time in 
post-contract management is spent 
on managing relations
The relationship manager must 
strike a fine balance between being 
a logistics problem solver and being 
a leader who can motivate and 
facilitate superior performance by 
the provider (Lynch, 2000)
The management of the client-
vendor relationship is composed of 
two dimensions: (1) the crafting of 
the sourcing arrangement, or 
formal management, and (2) the 
management of the external 
relationship, or infor- mal 
management. (Hirschheim et al. 
2009)
Understanding the business 
goals and policies of a partner 






Grouping of claims related to partnership quality
Grouping of claims related to two dimensions of partnership
Grouping of claims related to service quality
Grouping of claims related to governance of relationship
Grouping of claims related to conflict resolution
Represent combinations of two or more groupings
Proper management of 
the relationship is 
equally or more 
important than the basic 
contract management
















Figure 26 - Governance/Relationship Map 
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Successful IT outsourcing 
relies heavily on a 
psychological contract 
between the customer and 
the supplier. (Koh et. al., 
2004)
Customers perceive supplier obligations to 
be accurate project scoping, clear authority 
structures, taking charge, effective human 
capital management, effective knowledge 
transfer, and effective interorganizational 
teams. (Koh et. al., 2004)
Suppliers perceive customer obligations as 
clear specifications, prompt payment, close 
project monitoring, dedicated project staffing, 
knowledge sharing, and project ownership. 
(Koh et. al., 2004)
Results show that fulfilled 
obligations predict success 
over and above the effects 
of contract type, duration, 
and size. (Koh et. al., 2004)
Service quality and the 
establishment of elements 
of partnership are 
important determinants of 
outsourcing success. 
(Grover et. al. 1996)
The elements of partnership: 
trust, communication, 
satisfaction, and cooperation, are 
related to the perceived 
achievement of benefits.   
(Grover et. al. 1996; Mao et. al. 
2008)
Such elements might be difficult to 
build and sustain, and that tight 
contractual relationships might be 
required under certain conditions. 
However, trust plays a central role 
in the success of the IT outsourcing 
relatioanship   (Grover et. al. 1996; 
Cong & chau, 2007)
Partnership quality may 
serve as a key predictor 
of outsourcing success. 
(Lee & Kim,  1999)
Partnership quality was found to be 
positively influenced by factors such as 
participation, communication, 
information sharing, and top 
management support, and negatively 
affected by age of relationship and 
mutual dependency. (Lee & Kim,  1999)
Trust, norms, open 
communication, open sharing of 
information, mutual dependency, 
and cooperation are always 
associated with higher levels of IT 
Outsourcing success. (Lacity,  
2009)
<for outsourcing success> 
It is critical to develop a 
good rapport with the 
manager of the consulting 
firm. (Bennett & Sayers, 
1994; Mao et. al. 2008)
Clear lines of communication allow 
partners to freely discuss the progress of 
the project and any management 
concerns. (Lee & Kim,  1999; Bennet 
and Sayers, 1994)
Partnership quality and 
outsourcing success have a strong 
relationship (Lee & Kim, 1999, 
2003, 2005)
Partnership quality is not only 
critical to assure high-quality 
partnership, but also a key 
predictor for managing 
outsourcing for user and 
business satisfaction.(Lee & 
Kim, 1999, 2003, 2005)
Fostering a cooperative 
relationship based on trust, 
business understanding, benefit 
and risk share, and commitment 
is critical to reap the greatest 
benefits from outsourcing (Lee & 
Kim, 1999, 2003, 2005)
The cost of developing and 
maintaining partnerships can be 
high. (Klepper, 1995)
Information Management 
function (IM) is a 
prerequisite to effectively 
manage complex IT- 
outsourcing partnerships 
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)
The implementation of IM by the 
outsourcing company supports the 
alignment of business and IT within the 
outsourcing company and contributes to 
the governance of a complex IT-
outsourcing partnership. (Beulen & 
Ribbers, 2002)
The implementation of IM within the 
outsourcing company supports the 
relationship between the outsourcing 
company and the IT-supplier and 
contributes to the governance of a 
complex IT-outsourcing partnership. 





Grouping of claims related to psychological contract between client and vendor
Grouping of claims related to communication
Grouping of claims related to trust and satisfaction
Represent combinations of two or more groupings
Mutual benefits, commitment, and 
predisposition are key to 
understanding the process of 
outsourcing partnership development 
in order to establish high-quality 
partnerships with service providers 
(Lee & Kim, 2003)
Outsourcing relationship is 
not a static challenge but 
a dynamic process 
involving continual 
interaction and change 

















Figure 27 - Partnership Quality Map 
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The involvement of senior 
managers, and rigorous evaluation 
processes were associated with 
higher levels of IT Outsourcing 
success (Lacity,  2009; Kern and 
Willcocks, 2002; Zviran et al., 
2001)
Service and/or product 
delivery and its monitoring 
was found to be the 
fundamental driver of the 
relationship for client 
companies.  (Kern, 2000)
As these exchanges became 
institutionalised the relationship 
began to gain in status and 
benefits became visible  (Kern, 
2000)
All companies agreed the 
importance of continuously 
monitoring the satisfaction of those 
receiving IT services (Schwarz & 
Hirschheim, 2003)
To improve user satisfaction, clients found 
that vendors need to have a greater 
understanding of their business and to show 
more commitment, and should possibly 
initiate investments beyond the terms 
stipulated in the agreement to ensure that 
the working relationship is maintained. (Kern 
& Blois, 2002)
Only through high satisfaction 
levels can confidence in the 
vendor be built, which 
ultimately leads to trust. (Kern 
& Blois, 2002)
Service quality and the 
establishment of 




(Grover et. al. 1996)
The elements of partnership: 
trust, communication, 
satisfaction, and cooperation, are 
related to the perceived 
achievement of benefits.   
(Grover et. al. 1996; Mao et. al. 
2008)
Such elements might be difficult to 
build and sustain, and that tight 
contractual relationships might be 
required under certain conditions. 
However, trust plays a central role 
in the success of the IT outsourcing 
relatioanship   (Grover et. al. 1996; 
Cong & chau, 2007)
A multilevel 
communication structure 
contributes to a flexible IT 
outsourcing Partnership 
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)
Regular communication between 
the outsourcing company and the 
IT-suppliers is considered 
essential in establishing flexible 
partnership relationships.(Beulen 
& Ribbers, 2002)
However communication has to be 
organized. (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)
Continuity in personnel 
availability per IT 
outsourcing partnership 
contributes to the success 
of the relationship. (Beulen 
& Ribbers, 2002)
Changing people results in 
discontinuity in the management of 
the partnership. (Beulen & 
Ribbers, 2002)
Trust between client and 
vendor can improve 
customer relationship and 
project quality (Mao et. al, 
2008)
Effective communication and 
increased depth of information 






Grouping of claims related effective communication between parties
Grouping of claims related to personnel involvement
Grouping of claims related to trust and satisfaction

















Figure 28 - Service Quality Map 
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Well structured SLAs play 
an important role in 
cultivating favorable 
relationships. (Goo & 
Huang, 2008)
Firms strategically use 
SLA to successfully 
manage IT Outsourcing 
Relationships(Goo & 
Huang, 2008; Gellings, 
2007)
More contract detail, shorter-term 
contracts, and higher-dollar valued 
contracts were positively related to ITO 
success. (Lacity,  2009)
Well-developed SLAs not only 
provide a way to measure the 
service provider’s performance, 
but also enable effective 
management of outsourcing 
engagements through the 
development of partnership-style 
relationships with high levels of 
trust and commitment. (Goo et 
al., 2009)
Contracts and relational 
governance function as 
complements rather than as 
substitutes. (Goo et al., 2009; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002)
You can’t put everything in a 
contract, you can’t tie 
everything down. (Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks,1994)
The relationship needs to be 
flexible, and have the ability to 
change and grow (Cong, et al. 




fundamental to the 
governance of the 
outsourcing relationship
(Gewald, 2006)
The management of the client-
vendor relationship is composed of 
two dimensions: (1) the crafting of 
the sourcing arrangement, or 
formal management, and (2) the 
management of the external 
relationship, or informal 
management. (Hirschheim et al. 
2009)
Proper management of 
the relationship is equally 
or more important than the 
basic contract 
management (Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks,1994)
In order to structure the 
relationship and the 
communication with 
outsourcing companies, IT 
services suppliers must have a 
contract and account 
management (CAM) in place. 
(Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)
The implementation of proper contract & account 
management that mirrors the organization of the 
outsourcing company results in clear contacting 
point for the outsourcing company and ensures an 
effective communication between the outsourcing 
company and the IT-supplies and thus contributes 
to the governance of a IT-outsourcing partnership. 
(Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)
Establishing a partnership 
means that  anything not 
specifically mentioned in a 
contract will not cause problems.
(Fitzgerald & Willcocks,1994) Partnership is one of the key 
elements for successful 
outsourcing.(Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks,1994)
Disputes will be discussed 
and resolved in a spirit of 
partnership (Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks,1994)
A degree of flexibility is 
achieved through a 
partnership (Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks,1994)
More than 50% of the alliances fail 
due to relationship issues and not 
because of bad contracts or 
financial issues. (Gewald, 2006)
SLAs may act as a substitute for 
relational governance as these 
characteristics were found to 
dampen the level of trust and 
commitment through moderation 
effects (Goo et al., 2009)
A partnership approach 
of sharing risks and 
rewards may be more 
effective in bringing the 




Contract driven control approach is 
impractical and puts all the risk on 
the vendor. (Natovich, 2003)
Managers tend to employ greater 
levels of relational norms as their 
contracts become increasingly 




organizations from a 
purely economic point 
of view is unjustifiable. 
(Szu-Yuan, Tung-Ching 
et. al., 2002
Trust, mutual understanding and 
commitment are strongly related to 
outsourcing satisfaction. (Szu-Yuan, 
Tung-Ching et. al., 2002
The client pulls the relationship toward a 
hierarchy structure, wherein problems are 
addressed through mutual adjustments. The 
vendor, in contrast, pulls the relationship toward 
a market structure, dictated by a priori 
coordination structures and contracts. 
(Sabherwal, 2003)
Classical and neoclassical 
contract theory suffers from a 
rigidness that does not take 







Grouping of claims related to the importance of  SLA's
Grouping of claims related to contractual flexibility 
Grouping of claims related to the complementary nature of contracts and relationships





















facilitate solutions to 
problems and helps to 
avoid conflicts (Kern 
2000, Easton 1992)
Frequent communication is likely to 
lead to greater trust, and 
contrastingly greater 
trustworthiness can cause improved 
formal and informal communication 
(Kern 2000, Anderson and Narus,
1990; Dwyer et al., 1987).
Expectations depend on 
how the supplier reacts and 
responds to demands and 
changes made by the 
client's end-users (Kern, 
2000). Misalignment of 
ambitions and 
expectations is often 
found to be the root 
cause of problems (Kern, 
2000; Vowler, 1996).
Satisfaction in the outsourcing 
relationship will come about 
naturally with the achievement 
of the client's expectations 
(Kern, 2000). 




Vendors with whom the 
client more easily and 
successfully resolves 
disputes through bargaining 
are better potential partners 
than vendors who are 
difficult to deal with 
(Klepper,1995)..
Bargaining is critical to 
conflict resolution, which 
is important for 
partnership development 
(Klepper, 1995).
Bargaining arises as part of 
contract negotiations with every 
project undertaken by a vendor 
and often arises again when 
unforeseen mid-project 
circumstances require and 
adjustment of requirements and 
performance (Klepper, 1995).
A degree of cultural 
understanding, an element 
of flexibility regarding the 
contract, and a notion of fair 
deal has to exist in 
outsourcing relations 
(Fitzgerald and Willcocks, 
1994).
Problems in ventures tend to 
arise when the parties involved 
do not share the same social 
and cultural traits and norms 
(Kern, 2000). 
The level and nature of 
interdependence between 
organizations are likely to 
influence the potential and 
source for conflict. The higher 
the interdependence, the 
higher the risk for conflict and 
harm (Kumar & van Dissel, 
1996).
Increased level of 
interdependence between 
organizations is likely to 
increase the potential for conflict 
by increasing the need for 
coordination (Kumar & van 
Dissel, 1996).
The level of structure (the level 
of specification of roles, 
obligations, rights, procedures, 
information flows, and data) in 
the relationship can influence 
the potential for conflict. The 
potential risk of conflict is 
reduced with greater structure 
(Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).
Cultural similarity 
had no effect on 
partnership 
quality (Lee and 
Kim, 1999).
Outsourcing success 
was not affected by 
the degree of conflict 
between the service 
receiver and provider 
(Lee and Kim, 1999).
Poor communication is 
second only to poor 
planning as a major 
cause of outsourcing 
relationship failure 
(Lynch, 2000).
There is no quicker way to 
sabotage a relationship 
than to allow unpleasant 
surprises (Lynch, 2000).
A key to successful relationship is to 
maintain open communication at all 
times. Do not communicate only 
when there is a problem (Lynch, 
2000)
While disagreements 
between vendor and 
client are normal, they 
can become dangerous 
when the engagement 
falls into a vicious cycle 
(Natovich, 2003).
Lack of trust leads to a conflict that 
yields poor performance, which in 
turn damages the trust even more 
and causes more conflicts, and so 
on. At certain point the trust has 
reached such low level that any 
new conflict can put an end to an 
entire project (Natovich, 2003).
A successful relationship 
is identifiable by the way 
it handles conflict 
situations.  (Kern, 2000)
Contract-driven 
control is flawed 
(Natovich, 2003)
Each party may have a different 
interpretation of whether 
contractual obligations are met 
(Natovich, 2003)
Contract-driven management 
contributes to undermining the 
trust and commitment of the 
vendor (Natovich, 2003)
Longer-term contracts that 
lack flexibility tend to 




However detailed the contract, 
or favorable the terms, mot 
contracts cannot anticipate the 
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Figure 30 - Conflict Resolution Map
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APPENDIX F – EXAMPLE OF ARTICLE ANALYSIS 
!
In order to properly describe the methodology used to develop the argument maps for IT 
Outsourcing Governance, a step-by-step deconstruction of the arguments included in a paper is 
shown in order to demonstrate how claims, grounds, warrants and other argument components are 
identified. The article chosen for this purpose is “IT Outsourcing Success: A Psychological 
Contract Perspective” (Koh et al., 2004). This particular article was chosen because it presents a 
good example of a complete argument within a clear, well-defined topic.  
Following the methodology depicted by Fletcher and Huff (1990a,b), the deconstruction 
of the argument occurs in 4 stages.  
• First Pass: Read through the whole document, identifying topics, arguments, and the most 
obvious key claims.  
• Second Pass: Mark all claims, and identify grounds for each claim. 
• Third Pass: Within each argument, identify sub claims, elaborations and reiterations. 
• Fourth Pass: Provide implicit warrants wherever they are not obvious. 
First Pass 
A comprehensive read of the document yields an obvious topic that is clearly stated in the 
abstract and introduction. In addition, the main claim of the article is also clearly stated. Relevant 
sections of the abstract and introduction are included below, with the main topic and claim in 
underlined text. 
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“The purpose of the current study is to present a new perspective on managing 
outsourcing by focusing on both customers and suppliers through the unique lens of 
psychological contracting. A psychological contract refers to an individual’s mental 
beliefs about his or her mutual obligations in a contractual relationship (Rousseau 1995). 
Psychological contract theory offers a highly relevant and sound theoretical lens for 
studying IT outsourcing management because of its three distinctive principles: (1) its 
focus on mutual (rather than one-sided) obligations between contractual par- ties, (2) its 
emphasis on psychological (as distinct from legal) obligations, and (3) its emphasis on an 
individual (rather than interorganizational) level of analysis (p. 357).” 
After identifying the main topic of the article as described above, the main claim, or purpose of 
the article was also identified. 
“…successful IT outsourcing relies heavily on a psychological contract between the customer 
and the supplier. These psychological con- tract obligations may be written into the terms of a 
legal contract, or based simply on oral promises and other expressions of commitment made by 
the parties (p. 358).” 
One can observe that clear intent of the authors to advance the idea that psychological contracts 
are important for the success of an IT outsourcing arrangement. 
Second and Third Passes 
The second and third passes are combined in this analysis in order to provide a more succinct 
example. The emphasis of this stage is on the identification of grounds that support the claim that 
psychological contracts are important to the success of a sourcing relationship. The grounds 
offered to support the main claim are the results of studies performed by the authors. These 
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results are mentioned in the abstract and are discussed in more detail in other sections of the 
article. 
“Qualitative analysis identified six major components of what customers believe are 
supplier obligations in an outsourcing project. These were (1) accurate project scoping, 
(2) clear authority structures, (3) taking charge, (4) effective human capital management, 
(5) effective knowledge transfer, and (6) building effective interorganizational teams. 
Similarly, six major components representing what suppliers believe are customer 
obligations in an outsourcing project were determined to be (1) clear specifications, (2) 
prompt payment, (3) close project monitoring, (4) dedicated project staffing, (5) 
knowledge sharing, and (6) project ownership (p. 361).” 
The previously mentioned grounds highlight the existence of elements that are considered to 
comprise the psychological contract between customer and supplier. However, the existence of 
these elements is not enough to convince the reader that they are important for a successful 
outsourcing arrangement. In order to address this apparent shortcoming, the authors provide an 
explicit warrant that serves as a logical bridge to justify the claim on the basis of the grounds 
provided. 
Fourth Pass 
As stated by Fletcher and Huff (1990), the identification of warrants can be extremely 
challenging, as most of the time writers do not include them explicitly in their arguments. The 
purpose of the warrants is to show what the logical connection between the claims and the 
grounds is. In most cases, this connection is obvious, and therefore warrants can be omitted. 
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In the analysis of this article, the logical connection between grounds and claims is 
provided by the statement of an explicit warrant as depicted below. 
“…fulfilled obligations predict success over and above the effects of contract type, 
duration, and size (p. 356).” 
This warrant is reiterated in other sections of the article, making the connection between grounds 
and claim even more explicit. 
“Results from our study showed the existence of a psychological contract between 
outsourcing customers and suppliers, and that fulfilling these obligations explained a 
significant amount of the variance in out- sourcing success (p. 371).” 
Once all the components of the argument were identified, the claims, grounds and warrants were 
used in the development of the argument maps to graphically depict the different elements of the 
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